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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the problem of misreporting in the corporate setting, where managers
may commit accounting fraud, and in the public sector, where taxpayers may not truthfully report
their income. Both accounting fraud and income misreporting have contributed to unprecedented
financial losses to shareholders and governments respectively. As a result, policy-makers and share-
holders are focused on one goal, that is, to mitigate the occurrence of accounting fraud and income
misreporting. The process of achieving this goal starts with understanding how compensation con-
tracts and tax schemes influence an agent’s willingness to misreport. This dissertation pursues these
objectives using a blend of theory, experimental techniques, and exhaustive empirical analyses.
Chapter 1 has a theoretical focus; this chapter evaluates the incentive effects of various contracts
within the class of stock option contracts. In this chapter, we develop a principal-agent model of
managerial fraud to determine whether there exists a contract that ‘dominates’ another contract by
generating relatively greater effort while minimizing fraud. While there exists an infinity of stock-
option contracts that induce a given level of effort, we show that within the class of stock option
contracts, any two contracts that induce the same effort must necessarily induce the same level of
fraud. We also characterize the schedule of implementable effort-fraud pairs.
Chapters 2 and 3 have an experimental focus; in Chapter 2, we implement the theoretical
model in Chapter 1 and test whether contracts that are predicted to induce the same level of effort
and fraud are behaviorally equivalent. The experiment produced strong results in support of our
hypothesis. The predicted equivalent class of stock option contracts induced the same level of effort
and the same level of fraud. In a behavioral sense, stock option contracts are the same as simple
equity contracts.
Chapter 3 focuses on tax compliance behavior under the progressive and the regressive tax
systems in an experimental setting. This chapter contributes to the growing literature on tax
vi
compliance by experimentally testing whether tax compliance behavior of taxpayers is sensitive to
either the progressive or the regressive tax system. All else constant, experimental results showed no
difference in average tax compliance between the progressive and the regressive tax systems. How-
ever, fairness, risk-aversion, inequality aversion, and gender played an important role in explaining
variations in tax compliance behavior.
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Preface
The economic theory of crime has become a mainstay approach that is used by most economists
to rationalize criminal behavior problems, including agents’ willingness to either misreport the true
firm value or their true income. In these settings, a rational economic agent may engage in criminal
behavior if the benefits outweigh the costs associated with such activities. Becker (1968) was the
first to develop an economic theory of crime, in which people commit crime because the expected
utility of the payoff exceeds the expected disutility of getting caught and punished.
Criminal behavior in most economic settings is prevalent when there is an asymmetric informa-
tion problem. For example, across the corporate landscape, we can talk about shareholders being
victims of fraudulent reporting by managers. In addition, we can also discuss the untruthful income
reporting behavior of taxpayers to tax agencies. In both examples, one party has more information
than the other party. Ex-ante, both the manager and the taxpayer believe that they would not get
caught or avoid the punishment if they are caught. Ex-post, their actions disrupt the economic and
financial health of other economic agents.
The problem of criminal behavior is addressed under the umbrella of misreporting in two ways.
The first form of misreporting addressed in this dissertation is managerial fraud. Managerial fraud
refers to any falsification or misrepresentation of a firm’s true value. The second form of misreporting
is the understatement of one’s true income. When an agent under-reports his or her true income,
it is termed evasion. Under these two forms of misreporting, agents face an expected penalty for
providing misleading information. However, the economic gains from misreporting in these settings
are sometimes worthwhile.
The problem of managerial fraud and tax evasion is not only confined to the US. These two
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forms of misreporting are real and serious threats that can bring financial institutions of developed
nations to their knees. There are several documented cases that have been attributed to mounting
losses to either shareholders of public firms or governments. As an anecdote, the Enron scandal
was estimated to cost 4, 000 employees their jobs. In 1998, Russia was at the brink of a financial
crisis because the government was not able to collect sufficient tax revenue. For most governments,
these revenue losses may result in reducing support for vital public projects such as hospitals, road
construction, and building new schools.
This dissertation has been motivated by many factors, the most important of which is how to
mitigate managerial fraud or tax evasion. Both forms of misreporting have increasingly received
more attention in the wake of more corporate scandals and high mounting losses due to tax evasion.
As a result, policy-makers are more oriented towards discovering ways to assuage the occurrence of
managerial fraud. Firm owners today are also seeking better ways to incentivize managers without
attracting fraud. Furthermore, tax authorities or governments are also interested in discovering
mechanisms to discourage tax evasion in order to meet their financial obligations.
To incorporate the essential characteristics of criminal behavior, we model the agent’s decision
using the expected utility theory. Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), and Andergassen (2008),
we make the simple assumption that economic agents are risk neutral and face some uncertainty
about being caught for misreporting either the firm’s true value or income.
A manager’s response to incentive contracts provided to him or her by a firm owner is complicated
by the fact that managers can potentially manipulate the firm’s financial report which reflect the
firm’s value. Goldman and Slezak (2006) and Andergassen (2008) are examples of research work
that use the principal-agent model to examine the relationship between incentive contracts and
managerial fraud. There are numerous research studies that have established that some incentive
contracts induce unintended managerial fraud. While there are many ways of keeping fraud in
check, this dissertation will focus on reducing managerial fraud through contract design.
Experiments are also employed in this dissertation to examine the behavioral response of agents
to different incentive mechanisms and different tax regimes. Experiments are used in this disser-
tation because of the paucity of field data on managerial fraud and tax compliance. Nevertheless,
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experiments provide a fertile ground to generate clean data and test the behavioral response of
economic agents.
There have been made few initial attempts to examine the behavioral response of managers to
incentive contracts. The only existing research work is Bruner et al. (2008) and this study looks
at the behavioral response of managers as equity share and the probability of detection increases
when compensated with equity-based contracts. The objective of this study is to also examine the
behavioral response of managers when compensated with various forms of stock option incentive
contracts using laboratory experiments.
This dissertation also focuses on tax evasion by using experiments to examine how taxpayers
respond to different tax schemes. The existing literature indicates that tax compliance is affected
by many factors including the magnitude of fines, detection rates, social norms, perception, and
voting. Unfortunately, there is limited documentation on the tax evasion opportunities that may
exist when taxpayers are given either a progressive versus a regressive tax regime. Again, an
experimental approach is employed to compare the average tax compliance behavior of taxpayers
under either a progressive or a regressive tax regime.
The dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 1 , we compare the incentive effects of
various stock option contracts to examine whether there exists a contract that dominates another
by inducing relatively greater effort while minimizing fraud. In Chapter 2, we implement the theory
in Chapter 1 in an experimental setting. We explicitly test whether contracts that are predicted
to induce the same level of effort and fraud are equivalent in a behavioral sense. The concluding
chapter is an experimental analysis that focuses on the behavioral response of taxpayers under the
progressive and the regressive tax regimes.
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Chapter 1
Behavioral Equivalence of Stock Option
Incentive Contracts
1
1.1 Introduction
A common strategy for aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders is to give the
managers equity-based incentive contracts. Typically such contracts provide top management with
either shares of equity or options, which allow the managers to purchase the firm’s stock at a fixed
price. Hall and Liebman (1998) and Hall and Murphy (2003) document that stock options were
heavily used in the U.S. throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Anderson et al. (2000) also document that
these incentive contracts are especially pronounced in so-called “new-economy” firms like Microsoft
and Yahoo.1 These contracts have traditionally been used to induce productive effort,2 however,
there is mounting evidence that these types of contracts may have the unintended consequence
of inducing fraud. Beyond the anecdotal evidence provided by relatively recent corporate scandals
(for example, Tyco International, Enron, and Worldcom), there is growing theoretical and empirical
evidence linking managerial fraud to equity-based compensation.
In the words of Goldman and Slezak (2006), an equity-based compensation contract is a “double-
edged sword,” inducing productive effort from the manager while generating fraud as well. The
unintended consequences associated with equity compensation naturally lead to the question of how
to minimize a manager’s incentive to commit fraud. In response to the frequent corporate scandals
during the past decade, the US Congress took swift action to improve and tighten regulation laws by
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX attempts to mitigate fraud through regulation
by creating new and stricter standards to which public companies must adhere.3
Unfortunately, the capacity of firm owners to keep fraud in check is quite limited although
they are not insulated from the realized financial damages after the discovery of fraud. The use
of incentive contracts has only generated a dilemma for firm owners. The need for firm owners to
motivate productive effort from managers while motivating effort with equity-based contracts has
rather placed firm owners at a crossroad; whether to discontinue their use or find other means to
mitigate the occurrence of fraud. The latter sounds reasonable and has thus far been well accepted.
1Both Murphy (1999) and Ittner et al. (2003) comment that this form of compensation has not been limited to
top level management but has also been extended to the rank and file workers.
2Many theoretical studies like Jensen and Meckling (1976) favor the alignment view.
3See Cotten and Santore (2008) for a discussion of the whistle-blower protections contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation.
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For their part, owners have at least two means to control fraud. One is through monitoring of
management and stronger accounting controls; the other is through contract design, the focus of
this paper.
Our goal is to determine whether there exists one certain stock option contract that ‘behaviorally
dominates’ others by inducing relatively greater effort while generating relatively less fraud. To this
end, we provide a principal-agent model that allows us to compare the incentive effects of various
stock option contracts. Our model is similar to Goldman and Slezak (2006) who focused on equity
compensation and Andergassen (2008), who compared equity compensation to stock option. Since
effort is unobservable, the manager’s compensation is directly tied to the performance of the firm’s
stock by giving the manager a stock option contract. However, unlike standard agency models (Ross
(1973) and Holmstrom (1979)), we assume the manager can also fraudulently misreport the firm’s
financial status, thereby artificially inflating the market value of the firm. There is an exogenous
probability that the manager will be caught and sanctioned for inflating the firm’s value. Thus,
some fraud may go unpunished.
We show that, although there are infinitely many stock option contracts that induce a given
level of effort, all such contracts necessarily induce the same level of fraud. The result implies that
there is no way to mitigate fraud while maintaining a manager’s incentive to provide effort. We
also provide a simple characterization of equilibrium fraud as an increasing function of the induced
equilibrium effort, effectively providing a schedule of effort-fraud pairs that can be induced with
stock options.
A substantial stream of theoretical studies have examined the relationship between incentive
contracts and managerial fraud. Goldman and Slezak (2006) consider how the optimal pay-for-
performance sensitivity changes when managers can manipulate information regarding the firm’s
true value. Robison and Santore (2008) focus on owners’ incentive to conduct ex-ante monitoring,
which reduces the probability that fraud is possible, and ex-post monitoring, which increases the
probability of detecting fraud that has occurred. Kadan and Yang (2006) focus on earnings man-
agement and not actual fraud. They find that an increase in the “moneyness” of options leads to
an increase in earnings management.4
4There are other empirical and experimental works that focus on the relationship between various forms of com-
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Andergassen (2008) focuses on the optimal compensation for the manager from the owner’s
perspective when the manager can commit fraud. To our knowledge, Andergassen (2008) is the only
paper that compares the performance of different types of incentive contracts (for example, equity
versus options) when managers can commit fraud. Andergassen finds conditions under which the
owner prefers to compensate the manager with simple equity (stock option) contracts. Andergassen
(2008) claims that when the long-term negative effects of fraud are sufficiently large, long-term
stock price decreases as the incentives increase (that is as strike price increase); therefore stock-
based compensation is optimal. However, when the long term effects are sufficiently low, then
option-based compensation is optimal.
In contrast with Andergassen (2008), we focused on the optimal behavioral response of a manager
by comparing the incentive effects of various stock option contracts regardless of the expected cost
of the compensation contract. The result from our model suggests that if any two contracts induce
the same level of effort, they will induce the same level of fraud.
We also provide a simple characterization of equilibrium fraud as an increasing function of the
induced equilibrium effort, effectively providing a schedule of effort-fraud pairs that can be induced
with stock options. Since the schedule of implementable effort-fraud pairs depends on the curvature
of the penalty function, policy parameters then directly affect the shape of the effort-fraud pairs.
Thus, improving monitoring and accounting standards would only help to induce less fraud for the
same level of effort from the manager.
1.2 Model
We begin with a sketch of the model, followed by a more formal specification. There are three
periods in the model. Periods 1, 2, and 3 are referred to as the short-run and period 4 is referred to
as the long-run. A risk-neutral manager5 of a publicly traded firm receives a compensation package
pensation and managerial fraud. Ke (2003), Johnson et al. (2008), Burns and Kedia (2006), and Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) empirically provide a positive link between managerial fraud and equity-based incentive contracts.
However, there is a minority group that report otherwise. Erickson et al. (2006) for example, find no consistent
evidence that equity-based incentives are actually associated with fraud. The study by Bruner et al. (2008) is the
first to show the positive link between managerial fraud and incentive contracts in an experimental setting. They
find that as the share of equity increased, fraud also increased.
5Of course, we assume that the risk-neutral manager is cash-constrained and hence cannot buy the firm and
invest an appropriate level of effort. This assumption is consistent with the observations made within industries that
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consisting of a salary and stock options, which are vested in the short-run. The manager provides
unobservable effort which, along with an independent random productivity shock, determines the
true value of a firm. However, risk-neutral investors in the market do not directly observe the short-
run value of the firm, allowing the manager to fraudulently manipulate the firm’s market value. In
the event that the manager inflates the firm’s value, the firm’s long-run value is decreased, and with
some probability, the manager is sanctioned.
Our focus is on the manager’s behavior for various stock option contracts, regardless of the
expected compensation. To this end, we start with a risk-neutral manager who is compensated
with a stock option contract (α,K, ω), which allows the manager to buy share α(0 < α ≤ 1) of
the firm at price K ≥ 0 (the strike price), and also pays the manager a fixed salary ω. We assume
the salary is large enough that the manager accepts the contract. Our result does not depend on
whether the manager’s participation constraint bind or if the manager earns economic rents at the
given contract. Note that when K = 0, the stock option contract is equivalent to giving the manager
a share of equity.
In period 1, a risk-neutral manager6 chooses an effort level, e, and a fraud level, f . Throughout,
random variables are indicated with tilde (∼) and realized variables are indicated with no tilde.
On the other hand, managerial fraud artificially inflates the value observed by investors (perhaps
through misrepresentation of the firm’s financial health).
In period 2, the firm’s true short-run value 7 is a function of the manager’s effort, e ≥ 0, and
random shock, µ˜:
ST2 (e, µ˜) = v(e) + µ (1.1)
where v′ > 0, v′′ < 0 , and µ˜ ∈ [−∞,∞] has density function g(µ) > 0 and cumulative density
function G(µ) 8. While the true value is as given in equation (1.1), the value of the firm observed9
motivate firm managers with option-based compensation contracts.
6The assumption of risk-neutrality allows us to solely focus on the tradeoff between a manager’s effort and fraud
choice. We also argue that due to liquidity constraint, the risk-neutral manager cannot buy the firm and simply invest
the optimal amount of effort. This is consistent with what we observe in industries where managers are compensated
with stock-based compensation contracts.
7Here, the value of the firm is equivalent to the firm’s stock price since we normalize the number of share to one.
8The noise term can be interpreted as the uncertainty that exists between the period when the manager chooses
effort and develops a fraud and the period when the manager exercises the stock option.
9The observed firm value can be interpreted as the reported earnings on the balance sheets provided to the market
5
by investors is the true short-run value plus the amount of managerial fraud10
SO2 (e, f, µ˜) = S
T
2 (e, µ˜) + f = v(e) + µ˜+ f (1.2)
Although the market does not observe the true value of the firm, the market is rational and an-
ticipates the manager’s choice of fraud and the resulting damages to the long-run value. Let fe
denote the level of fraud expected by investors in the market. In period 3, investors incorporate
their expectations, fe, and the observed value of the firm, SO2 , to arrive at the market price, SM3 .
Below we discuss the pricing rule used by investors. Finally, the manager exercises the options if
SM3 > K; that is, if the options are “in the money.”
In period 4, we assume that the market learns the true long-run value of the firm. We also
assume that managerial fraud (weakly) decreases the long-term value of the firm. Let D(f) denote
the decrease in the firm’s long-term value that arises from the manager’s fraudulent activity, where
D(0) = 0 and D′ ≥ 0. Thus, regardless of whether or not the manager is sanctioned for fraud
(discussed more below), the long-term value of the firm is
ST4 (e, f, µ) = S
T
2 (e, µ)−D(f). (1.3)
Although the market does not observe the true value of the firm, rational investors recognize
the potential for fraud and rationally anticipates the manager’s choice of fraud and any resulting
damages to the long-term value. Therefore, investors are willing to pay the observed value less the
expected fraud, fe, and less any expected long-term damages, D(fe):
ST4 (e, f, µ, f
e) = SO2 (e, f, µ)− fe −D(fe) = v(e) + µ+ f − fe −D(fe). (1.4)
The above equation can be thought of as a pricing rule, which incorporates the observed value of the
firms’ and the investors’ expectations regarding fraud. Note that if these expectations are correct,
by public firms.
10The market does not observe the true value of the firm. Rather the manager sends a report to the market, which
may overstate the true value of the firm. Let f denote the amount by which the manager overstates the true value
of the firm, also referred to as fraud.
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so that f = fe, the pricing rule in equation (1.4) implies SM3 (e, f, µ, fe) = ST2 (e, µ) − D(f) =
ST4 (e, f, µ). In other words, as long as the expectations are correct, the market price equals the true
long-term value.
The effort and fraud both entail a cost to the manager. The monetary cost of effort is certain
and is given by the function φ(e), where φ(0) = 0 , φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > 0. Fraud also has an expected
cost for the manager: If the manager commits fraud, then with probability p(0 < p < 1)11, the
fraud will be detected and the manager will pay sanction x(f), where x(0) = 0, x′ > 0and x′′ > 0.
Throughout, we ignore the uninteresting case when the manager chooses effort, e = 0.
The sequence of events for the outlined model is as follows: First, the manager simultaneously
chooses unobservable levels of effort and fraud and the noise term is simultaneously realized. Second,
the market observes the short-run value of the firm, SO2 . Third, the manager exercises the option if
SM2 > K. Fourth, the firm’s long-term value ST4 decreases by D(f) with probability p, the fraud is
detected12 and the manager pays sanction x(f).
Prior to the realization of µ˜, the risk-neutral manager’s expected utility is
E
[
U˜M
]
= E
[
Max{0, α(S˜M3 −K)}
]
+ ω − φ(e)− p · x(f) (1.5)
Note that from (1.4) it follows that S˜M3 < K iff µ˜ < K − v(e)− f − fe +D(fe). Therefore, using
(1.4) the manager’s expected utility can be written as
E
[
U˜M
]
=
∫ ∞
4(e,f)
α (v(e) + f − fe −D(fe) + µ˜−K) g(µ)dµ+ ω − φ(e)− p · x(f) (1.6)
where 4(e, f) = K − v(e) − f − fe − D(fe). The first term represents the share of the expected
gain from the stock option when the market stock price is above the strike price. The second
term represents the cost of the manager’s choice of effort and the last term represents the expected
sanction cost to the manager if he or she is caught committing fraud.
11For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we follow Goldman and Slezak (2006) and Andergassen (2008) by
allowing the level of detection to be exogenously determined. The results continue to hold for a more general expected
sanction function, such as h(f) = p(f)x(f), as long as h(f) is a convex function.
12Our assumption that the manager is able to exercise the option prior to fraud being detected is similar to Goldman
and Slezak (2006). However, Andergassen (2008) assumes that the manager does not receive the proceeds from the
illegal activity if the fraud is detected.
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The first-order condition for effort is
∫ ∞
4(e,f)
α[v′(e)]g(µ)dµ+ α [v(e) + f − fe −D(fe)− v(e)− f + fe +D(fe) +K]
×g (K − v(e)− f + fe +D(fe)) · v′(e)− φ′(e) = 0 (1.7)
The first-order condition for fraud is
∫ ∞
4(e,f)
αg(µ)dµ+ α [v(e) + f − fe −D(fe)− v(e)− f + fe +D(fe) +K]
×g (K − v(e)− f + fe +D(fe))− px′(f) = 0 (1.8)
In equilibrium, we expect the market’s expectations regarding fraud to be correct. Define (e∗, f∗)
as the manager’s equilibrium choice of effort and fraud when the market’s expectations are correct.
Formally, if we substitute f = fe into (1.7) and (1.8), we get two equations that implicitly define
(e∗, f∗):
α [1−G(K − v(e∗) +D(f∗))]− φ
′(e∗)
v′(e∗)
= 0 (1.9)
α [1−G(K − v(e∗) +D(f∗))]− px′(f∗) = 0 (1.10)
For notational convenience, we write (e∗, f∗) rather than (e∗(α,K, p), f∗(α,K, p)) whenever there
is no risk of confusion.
1.3 Result
There exist many stock option contracts that induce the same equilibrium behavior. To see this, let
(e∗, f∗) denote the equilibrium choice when the contract is (α,K, ω). Now consider another contract
(α1,K1, ω1) such that
α1
[
1−G (K1 − v(e∗) +D(f∗))] = α [1−G (K − v(e∗) +D(f∗))] (1.11)
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It is easily observed that (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) imply
α1
[
1−G (K1 − v(e∗) +D(f∗))]− φ′(e∗)
v′(e∗)
= 0 (1.12)
α1
[
1−G (K1 − v(e∗) +D(f∗))]− px′(f∗) = 0 (1.13)
Since (1.12) and (1.13) are identical to (1.9) and (1.10), it follows that (e∗, f∗) are the manager’s
equilibrium choices when he is compensated with (α1,K1, ω1). The above discussion yields the
following result.
Proposition 1:
Let (e∗, f∗) denote the manager’s equilibrium choice of effort and fraud when the contract is (α1,K1, ω1),
then (e∗, f∗) is also the manager’s equilibrium choice of effort and fraud for any contract (α2,K2, ω2),
satisfying (1.11).
According to Proposition 1, there exist infinitely many contracts capable of inducing the same
behavior. It is also easy to see that in order to induce same equilibrium behavior, (e∗, f∗), and
increase in the strike price must be accompanied by an increase in α. Rearranging (1.11) yields
α1 − α = [1−G (K − v(e∗) +D(f∗))]− [1−G (K1 − v(e∗) +D(f∗))] (1.14)
We now ask whether it is possible for one contract to fraud dominate another. That is, we ask
whether it is possible to design a stock option contract that induces (weakly) greater effort and
strictly less fraud than some other contract. The answer is no.
Proposition 2:
Let e∗ denote the manager’s equilibrium choice of effort for some contract (α,K, ω), then the man-
ager’s equilibrium choice of fraud is f∗ = h(e∗), where h(e∗) ≡ y( φ′(e∗)pv′(e∗)) is an increasing function
and y is the inverse function of x′(f).
Proof: First note that the assumption x′′ > 0 implies that x′ has an increasing inverse function.
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By definition, (1.9) and (1.10) define (e∗, f∗). Combining (1.9) and (1.10) yields
x′(f∗) = φ
′(e∗)
pv′(e∗)
(1.15)
Since y is the inverse function of x′, it follows that y(x′(f∗)) = f∗ which along with (1.15) implies
f∗ = y(
φ′(e)
pv′(e)
). (1.16)
Finally, the assumptions that φ′′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 imply that the function b(e) = φ
′(e)
pv′(e) is an increasing
function. Therefore, the composite function h(e) = y( φ
′(e)
pv′(e)) is an increasing function of effort. 
The above proposition provides a schedule of effort-fraud pairs13 that can be induced by stock
option contracts. This schedule ultimately depends on the curvature of the cost function, φ(e), the
production function, v(e), the sanction function, x(f), and the probability of detection, p. Changes
in any of these factors will alter the effort-fraud schedule. For example, consider the impact of an
increase in the probability of detection on the effort-fraud schedule. Differentiation of (1.16) with
respect to f and p while holding e constant yields
df∗
fp
= − 1
x′′( φ
′(e∗)
pv′(e∗))
· [p
2v′(e∗)
φ′(e∗)
]. (1.17)
Thus, an increase in the probability of detection shifts the effort-fraud schedule down, implying less
fraud for a given level of effort.
1.4 Conclusion
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, stock options have been used to align the interests of managers
with those of owners. However, the recent wave of corporate scandals illustrates that managerial
fraud can be an unintended consequence of incentive contracts tied to a firm’s stock price. It
thus behooves owners to look for ways to motivate managerial effort while minimizing a manager’s
13See Figure 3 in the appendix for a graphical illustration of effort-fraud pairs. This figure shows that by increasing
the probability of detection, the effort-fraud pair is shifted downward.
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incentive to commit fraud.
The finding in this paper comes from a model of managerial fraud that focused on the optimal
behavioral response by comparing the incentive effects of various stock option contracts regardless
of the expected cost of the compensation. We demonstrated that within the class of stock option
contracts (including simple equity), any two contracts that induce a given level of managerial effort
will necessarily induce the same level of fraud. As a result, there is no way to reduce the severity
of fraud without a simultaneous reduction in managerial effort through contract design. We also
characterized a schedule of implementable effort-fraud pairs.
It follows that it is optimal for owners to offer the contract that induces a given level of effort
at the least cost, since the induced fraud is uniquely determined by the level of effort. Finally,
increasing the probability of detection by improving accounting controls and strengthening mon-
itoring mechanisms can shift the schedule of implementable effort-fraud pairs down, so that less
fraud accompanies a given level of effort.
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Chapter 2
Behavioral Equivalence of Stock Option
Incentive Contracts: Evidence from
Experiments
12
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 provides an extension of Chapter 1 by implementing the theoretical model in a controlled
experimental setting. As discussed in the previous chapter, incentive contracts are referred to as
‘behaviorally equivalent’ if they induce the same level of effort and the same level of fraud. The
focus of this chapter is to provide an answer to the following questions: Do incentive contracts that
are predicted to be equivalent induce similar behavior? Is there any contract that ‘dominates’ other
contracts by inducing relatively greater effort while generating relatively less fraud?
In practice, different equity-based incentive contracts are used by firm owners to prod high
productive effort from firm managers. From a behavioral perspective, one may argue that the
various equity-based compensation contracts may induce different behavioral response from firm
managers. The possibility that managerial effort induced by these incentive contracts may be
accompanied by managerial fraud raises huge concern. The problem of managerial fraud, which
may be excessive for certain contract types has consequently prompted both policy-makers and firm
owners to re-examine the way to use them. Policy-makers have played an active role in mitigating
fraud through regulation by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Perhaps firm owners can
also play an effective role to keep fraud in check although they are equipped with limited set of
tools. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, firm owners can mitigate fraud associated with equity
or stock option incentive contracts in two ways. First, through monitoring of management and
stronger accounting controls. The other is through contract design, the focus of this experimental
test. The theory in Chapter 1 predicts that even though firm owners can reduce fraud through
contract design, they cannot reduce fraud without reducing productive effort from managers.
The nature of the manager’s response to different incentive contracts (in terms of how much
effort they invest or fraud they commit) is ultimately an empirical question. An empirical approach
crucially depends on the measure of effort and fraud associated with predicted equivalent incentive
contracts. Given the difficulty of directly measuring managerial effort and fraud in reality, an
experimental approach is used to generate a sample of effort and fraud decisions associated with
equalized contracts.
There is an empirical literature that focuses on the relationship between various forms of com-
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pensation1 and managerial fraud. For example, Johnson et al. (2008) find strong evidence that the
likelihood of fraud is positively related to unrestricted stocks used by firms as a means of com-
pensating managers. However, they find no support for an increase in the likelihood of fraud when
management received restricted stock, vested options or unvested options.2 Bergstresser and Philip-
pon (2006) and Burns and Kedia (2006) all find that some incentive contracts cause more fraud.
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examine whether increase in accruals are related to increase in
stock-based CEO compensation. They conclude that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate
reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where CEO compensation is more closely tied to the
company’s share prices. They also document that the period of high accruals coincide with the
periods when CEOs sold unusually large amounts of their options. Burns and Kedia (2006) find
that the sensitivity of the CEOs option portfolios to stock price is significant and positively related
to the propensity to misreport. However, they find that other components of CEO compensation,
like simple equity, do not have a significant impact on the propensity to misreport.
While the general focus of Johnson et al. (2008), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and Burns
and Kedia (2006) so far has been on the propensity to misreport under different incentive contracts,
these studies do not allow one to determine whether one incentive contract dominates another in
a behavioral sense. As previously mentioned, these studies reported that some incentive contract
types were causing more fraud. However, it is plausible that these contracts also induced more
unobservable effort from managers relative to other contract types. Therefore, an empirical approach
using field data may not be an entirely clean experiment. An experimental approach is well suited
to to generate clean data for this empirical analysis.
Laboratory experiments can also be useful in many ways. The laboratory offers many advantages
over field studies when comparing the behavior induced by various incentive contracts. Firstly,
while the level of equity-based executive compensation is generally public knowledge, the effective
enforcement effort is not public information. The controlled experimental setting allows us to control
the probability of detection and guarantee that this probability is known by the manager. Secondly,
1Murphy (2003) cite that there has been increasing use of equity-based compensation for top-level executives.
2Ironically, according to Jeff Skilling’s indictment, he received approximately $300 million from the sale of Enron
stock options and restricted stock, netting over $89 million in profit [Kay (2004)].
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in the laboratory we are able to implement contracts that are predicted to induce identical behavior,
rather than trying to compare contracts that are observed in the field. Thirdly, in the laboratory
we are able to observe all managerial fraud, including the fraud that goes undetected. Finally, the
laboratory allows us to observe managerial effort precisely which would otherwise not be observable
in the field. It is noteworthy that in a controlled environment, we can observe every decision subjects
make. Thus, the experimental approach is well suited to test our model’s predictions.
There has been only one experimental study on the behavioral response of managers to equity-
based incentives. Bruner et al. (2008) examined the correlation between equity-based compensation
contract and both managerial effort and fraud. They reported that as the share of equity increased,
the observed effort and fraud increased. The observed fraud level was also reported to decrease as
the probability of detection increased.3 This latter result suggests that a legislation like SOX can
be effective in mitigating fraud.
The experiment was designed to provide some "parallelism" to the naturally occurring environ-
ment faced by managers that are compensated with stock option incentive contracts. As pointed
by Plott (1987), this should be an important feature of an experiment to make some generalization
of our results beyond the lab. Consequently the subject-managers were compensated with either
simple equity or conventional stock option compensation contract. Once the subject-manager was
given a contract, he or she was given an opportunity to make two consequential decisions; to increase
a project value by making a contribution from his initial salary and to artificially inflate the value
of the project. The reported project value was checked according to some exogenous probability
and sanctioned if caught reporting an artificial amount.
We find no statistical difference between both effort and fraud levels induced by simple equity
and stock option incentive contracts. Thus, the evidence from the experiment provide strong support
for behavioral equivalence between contracts that are predicted to induce the same level of effort
and the same level of fraud. The broad implication of this result is that, there is no way to reduce
fraud without reducing effort. Therefore, firm owners will be better off choosing the cheapest
incentive contract within the class of stock option contracts to motivate productive effort from the
3Although effort was predicted to remain unchanged after an increase in the probability of detection, the observed
effort level actually increased.
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firm manager.
2.2 Theoretical Model of Managerial Fraud
The model in Chapter 1 provides the basis of comparing the amount of effort and fraud induced
from various stock option contracts including simple equity. A brief sketch of the model that is
implemented in the laboratory is provided below.
The model consists of three players: a risk-neutral owner, a risk-neutral manager, and a risk-
neutral investor. The owner hires the manager who is compensated with either stock option or
simple equity contract . The stock option contract is defined by (α,K, ω), where α is the share
of the firm offered to the manager in the form of stock options, K represents the strike price for
the option, and ω is the manager’s fixed salary. The simple equity contract is defined by (α, ω).
Given either the stock option or simple equity contract, the manager must simultaneously make two
decisions; the level of effort to invest in the firm and the value of the firm to report to the market.
The manager’s investment in effort, E directly adds value to the firm. The firm’s true value is
ST = v(E) + µ, where v(E) is the deterministic firm value, and µ ∈ [−b, b]4 is the random pro-
ductivity shock that is assumed to be uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution is primarily
used because it is relatively easier to implement and explain to subjects in the experiment. When
the manager invests an effort level of E, the manager also incurs a monetary cost denoted by φ(E).
In addition to choosing an effort level, E, the manager can potentially inflate the value of the
firm. The amount by which the manager inflates the true value of the firm is referred to as fraud,
F .5 The reported firm value, SR = v(E) + µ+ F , is observed by the market.
The potential that the firm manager can manipulate the firm’s financial report is enough to
motivate firm owners and investors to form expectations about the fraud level, F e, in the market.
The market rationally incorporates this information in the determination of the firm value. The
market firm value, SM = v(E) + µ+F −F e is also referred as the pricing rule for the firm’s stock.
4See the Appendix for a graphical illustration of the potential distribution of “true values” (stock prices) for a
given effort level. For example, when the effort level is E1, the value of the stock ranges between S1 and S2 with a
mean value of v(E1).
5Fraud, F simply represents any accounting and financial manipulation or misreport of the true value of the firm.
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Undetected fraud is not costly to the manager; however the manager’s report to the market may
be audited with some exogenous probability, p. If fraud is detected, a sanction denoted by x(F ) is
imposed on the manager. The fraud sanction increases with the amount of fraud.
Because we assume a uniform distribution, the location of the strike price can potentially gen-
erate three scenarios. The first scenario is when the equilibrium levels of effort and fraud are large
enough to guarantee that the stock market price is always above the strike price: S
¯
> K. The
second scenario is when the market stock price is always below the strike price: S¯ < K. The third
scenario is when the equilibrium effort and fraud levels guarantee that the market stock price is
above the strike price with some probability. The second case is not very interesting because the
manager will always choose an effort level, E = 0 and fraud level, F = 0. Hence, for a given location
of the strike price, the value of the option to the manager is the max{S −K, 0}.
The manager chooses effort and fraud to maximize his or her expected utility from the option.
For the scenario in which the option is always above-water, S
¯
> K, the manager’s objective is given
by:
max
F≥0,E≥0
α
2b
·
∫ S¯
S
¯
(v(E) + F − F e + µ−K) dµ− φ(E)− p · x(F ) (2.1)
At the interior, the first-order condition with respect to effort, E is:
α · v′(E)− φ′(E) = 0 (2.2)
and the first-order condition with respect to fraud, F is:6
α− p · x′(F ) = 0 (2.3)
For the scenario in which the option may be either above or under-water (S
¯
< K < S¯), the
6For a meaningful solution, the second-order conditions must be satisfied. The second-order conditions with
respect to effort and fraud are α · v′′(E)− φ′′(E) < 0 and −p · x′′(F ) < 0 respectively.
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optimal effort and fraud choices are the solutions to7
max
F≥0,E≥0
{
α
2b
∫ S¯
K
(v(E) + F − F e + µ−K) dµ− φ(E)− p · x(F )
}
(2.4)
At the interior solution, the simplified first-order condition with respect to E is
α · v′(E) · pi(E,F, F e,K)− φ′(E) = 0 (2.5)
Similarly, the simplified first-order condition with respect to F is8
α · pi(E,F, F e,K)− p · x′(F ) = 0 (2.6)
where pi(E,F, F e,K) is the probability function of being above-water.
The results from the first-order conditions are standard. For example, the marginal benefit of
effort (fraud) should equal the marginal cost effort (fraud). As previously shown in Chapter 1, the
above analysis indicate that if two distinct incentive compensation contracts induce the same level
of managerial effort, E∗, then they also induce the same level of fraud, F ∗. This implies that the
only difference between a simple equity contract (i.e., a stock option with K = 0) that induces effort
level E∗ and a stock option contract that induces the same effort is the expected compensation to
the manager.9 We test this claim in the laboratory.
2.3 Experiment
We conduct an experiment designed to test whether one type of incentive contract ‘dominates’
another by inducing greater effort while minimizing fraud. This hypothesis is tested in the laboratory
by comparing different types of incentive contracts (stock options and simple equity) that are
7We show in the Appendix 3.6 that the two objective functions represented by equations 2.1 and 2.4 converge as
K → s
¯
, implying that the manager is objective is continuous.
8The optimal level of effort and fraud is guaranteed if we have a regular maximum. This local maximization
conditions are αv′′pi + αpiEv′ − φ′′ < 0 and αpiF − px′′(F ) < 0 for the effort and fraud equations respectively. The
sufficient condition for a global max depends on the Hessian matrix, H =
„
αv′′pi + αv′piE − φ′′ αv′piF
αpiE αpiF − px′′
«
.
The Hessian matrix must be negative semi-definite.
9See Appendix 3.6 for the proof.
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equivalent. The incentive contracts are equivalent in the sense that they are predicted to induce
identical behavior.10
The experimental design to some limited extent replicates Bruner et al. (2008) by allowing
subjects to choose effort and fraud for a given equity-based contract. The experiment by Bruner
et al. (2008) tested the response of managerial effort and fraud to changes in the share of equity
or the probability of detection. They found that effort and fraud increased as the share of equity
increased. Fraud decreased as the probability of detection increased.11 Our experimental design in
contrast to their study differs in two ways. Firstly, our design incorporates stock option incentive
contracts. Secondly, this experiment incorporates noise in a three-staged experiment.
Seventy-one inexperienced12 undergraduate students participated in the experiments. The inex-
perienced human subjects were recruited from different disciplines from The University of Tennessee
for each experimental session. Each session lasted for approximately 75 minutes and each subject
typically earned between $15 and $24. The amount the subject earned depended on their own
performance in the experiment. All entries by the subjects were made at their respective computer
terminals via a mouse, and all calculations were performed by the computer.
At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects were randomly seated behind a computer
terminal to input their decisions. The human subjects played the role of the manager while the
shareholders and investors were computerized using the Ztree software. Subjects were not allowed to
communicate with each other. They were allowed to talk to the experimenter only for the purposes
of clarifying the instructions of the experiment. The first task that was performed by the subjects
was the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation gamble choice exercise. This is a typical exercise that
requires the subjects to choose between a sure return and a gamble. This method enabled us to
classify the subjects as being risk averse or not.
In the gamble choice exercise, subjects chose between ten individual gambles, paying either 0.50
10Experiments are important for many reasons. Experiments are especially useful in circumventing problems
intrinsic to field data. Lab experiments are complementary to theory in that they provide controlled environments.
Experiments also allow an experimenter to isolate parameter values that alter behavior. Finally, lab experiments
allow experimentalist to artificially generate clean data for empirical analysis.
11In Bruner et al. (2008), effort was predicted to remain unchanged with changes in the probability of detection.
However, they rejected the null hypothesis.
12They were inexperienced in that they had not participated in this experiment before.
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Table 2.1: The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions
Option A Option B Expected Payoff Difference
1/10 of $5.00, 9/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$2.05
2/10 of $5.00, 8/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$1.6
3/10 of $5.00, 7/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$1.15
4/10 of $5.00, 6/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$0.70
5/10 of $5.00, 5/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$0.25
6/10 of $5.00, 4/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $0.20
7/10 of $5.00, 3/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $0.65
8/10 of $5.00, 2/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $1.1
9/10 of $5.00, 1/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $1.55
10/10 of $5.00, 0/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $2.00
or 5 lab dollars, and a guaranteed amount of 3 lab dollars. A screen shot of the gamble game
is shown in Figure 9. The list of paired lottery and guaranteed options that subjects chose from
is provided in Table 2.1. As shown in Table 2.1, Option A is a riskier choice while Option B
is a safer choice. The gambles vary in their respective probabilities of winning the large prize.
When the probability of a high outcome increases, the subject should cross over from Option B to
Option A. In this setup, risk-averse subjects should potentially switch over to Option A after the
fifth choice when the expected payoff difference is $0.20. After they completed this task, subjects
received instructions on their computer screens pertaining to the experiment. The instructions for
the experiment13 are provided in the Appendix 3.6. The subjects were also presented with examples
of the relevant information screens, definitions, and descriptions of the information pertinent to the
experiment. Since the University of Zurich’s Ztree program does not allow subjects to review past
instructions, we also provided a hard copy of the instructions of the experiment to the subjects.14
2.3.1 Experimental Design
Table 2.2 gives a summary of the parameter values used in the experiment. At the beginning
of each decision round, each subject-manager received an incentive contract which was either a
13See Figures 9 to 26 for the instructions of the experiment.
14About 84% of the subject said that they understood the instructions of the experiment extremely well. The
lowest rating for the clarity of the instruction was 3 from a range of 0 to 5.
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Table 2.2: Parameter Values
Contracts Options Simple Equity
Share α = 0.50 α = 0.35
Strike Price K = 850 K = 0
Salary S = 150 S = 120
Detection Probability p = 20% p = 20%
stock option or a simple equity. The components of the incentive contract (listed in Table 2.2)
consisted of shares offered in terms of equity, the level of strike price, and a salary. For example,
the stock option contract is defined by the set (α = 0.50,K = 850, S = 150) whereas the simple
equity contract is defined by the set (α = 0.35, S = 120). Contract (α = 0.35, S = 120) is
affiliated with equations (2.2) and (2.3) because this contract guarantees that the option will always
be in the money as long as the manager chooses the optimal effort and fraud levels. However,
the contract (α = 0.50,K = 850, S = 150) is associated with equations (2.5) and (2.6) because
the strike price, K = 850 is large enough such that, the optimal level of effort and fraud only
guarantees the option to be ‘in the money’ with some probability. The probability of being ‘in the
money’, pi, when the equilibrium effort and fraud levels are chosen for the stock option contract,
(α = 0.50,K = 850, S = 150) is 70%.15 To illustrate how these contracts are equivalent, consider
equations (2.3) and (2.6). Recall that equation (2.3) is associated with contract (α = 0.35, S = 120).
According to this equation, the expected benefit of fraud should equal 0.35 in equilibrium. Equation
(2.6) which is associated with the stock option contract (α = 0.50,K = 850, S = 150) also suggest
that the expected benefit of fraud should equal 0.35 (= 0.5 × 0.7). Holding all else constant, the
expected benefit and cost associated with these contracts must therefore be equivalent. It is implied
that the effort and fraud levels induced from these contracts are also the same.
For a particular treatment session, each subject-manager received the same type of contract.
After the subject-managers received the contract, they had to make two consequential decisions. In
15The formula for calculating the probability of being ‘in the money’ is
pi(E,F, F e,K) =
v(E∗) + b+ F ∗ − F e −K
2× b (2.7)
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this experiment, the subjects were given the opportunity to contribute, Ci ∈ [0, 120], to a project
that had an uncertain return. Each contribution amount was associated with a project value, V (Ci).
The project value, V (Ci), was listed alongside each contribution level provided to the subject-
manager. Subject-managers could increase the value of the project by simultaneously choosing to
make a contribution and to artificially inflate, Ai ∈ [0, 400], the true value of the project. The
contribution amount by the subject-manager is analogous to effort. Effort has diminishing returns
and was not costless. The cost of each level of effort contribution by the subject-manager was
normalized to one. This reduced the salary of the manager by the amount of the effort contribution.
Similar to our model, the choice of effort directly affected the distribution of the project value.
For example, high effort levels corresponded to the realization of high draws of project values and low
effort levels corresponded to the realization of low draws. Following the theoretical model described
in the previous section, the subject-manager faced some uncertainty. The uncertainty about the
project value stemmed from the fact that the subject did not know ex-ante the value of the random
component, µ. The random component was constrained to a uniform distribution that takes any
value from −400 to 400. This means that any value within this range is equally likely. The sum of
the project value, artificial component and the random component is referred to as reported project
value.
The possibility of fraud occurring in the market is all that is required for investors and share-
holders to form expectations of fraud in the market. However, subjects were not given information
on the expected fraud level, F e. Therefore, the final project value that the subjects see can be
interpreted as the reported project less the expected fraud. The final realized project value is the
sum of three components: the project value determined by the effort contribution, the artificial
component (fraud), and the random component. The final realized value of the project is denoted
by FVi = V (Ci) +Ai +µ, and is synonymous to the market stock price. Since F e is set to zero, the
market project value is equivalent to the reported project value in this experiment.
Similar to the theoretical model, choosing an artificial component amount (fraud) was not cost-
less. In each treatment, the probability of detection was set to 20%. The manager faced a sanction
when caught reporting in excess of the true project value. For simplicity, we adopted the possibility
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of a detection mechanism that was imperfect. This meant that some artificial component went
undetected. The sanction for choosing an artificial component (fraud) increased with increments in
the amount of artificial component. The sanction levels denoted by P (Ai) were displayed on the
screen alongside with each artificial component level. Figure 24 shows the subject’s screen image
for this stage.
We conducted 4 sessions, each lasting 75 minutes with about 17 or 18 participants per session.
To facilitate the search for the optimal effort and fraud bundle, the experiment was repeated for 20
rounds. After each round, the subject received feedback on their choices and earnings. The earnings
of the subject-manager is defined according to
earnings =

α(FVi −K) + (S − Ci), if K < FVi & not checked
α(FV −K) + (S − Ci)− P (Ai), if K < FVi & checked
(S − Ci), if K > FVi & not checked
(S − Ci)− P (Ai), if K > FVi & checked
(2.8)
In addition to the subject’s salary, the earnings of the subject in part depended on whether the
final value of the project was above a threshold amount denoted by K. The total earnings of the
subject also depended on whether his or her final project value was checked and whether he or she
chose an artificial component.
In summary, the strategic problem of any subject-manager is the tradeoff between how much to
contribute to the project (effort) and how much to inflate the project value (fraud). By increasing
his or her contribution level, the subject’s salary was reduced. Also, by inflating the project value,
the subject potentially faced a sanction. In the strategy space that we provided in the experiment,
the following itemized strategies are not optimal: (i) zero effort or fraud; (ii) maximum effort
or fraud. The dominant strategy in our calibrated experimental setting is to a choose a unique
positive amount of contribution, Ci > 0, and a unique positive amount of artificial component,
Ai > 0. Details of the dominant strategy for each incentive contract is discussed below.
Before proceeding further with the experimental design, let us introduce the following notation
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Table 2.3: Experimental Design
Treatments
Simple Equity Stock Option
Contract ET (36) ST (35)
Simple Equity - These are contract types that are always in the money.
Option - These are contract types that are guaranteed to be in the money with some probability when the optimal
effort and fraud levels are chosen.
The values in ( ) represent the number subjects in each cell.
- ET and ST . The simple equity type contract is denoted by ET , while the stock option type
contract is denoted by ST . The experimental treatment structure yields a 1 × 2 factorial design
resulting in two treatments.16 The treatments vary by their prediction of effort and fraud level and
their contract type (which is either simple equity or stock option).
Two equivalent contracts were constructed; a conventional stock option and a simple equity
contract. Both incentive contracts were predicted to induce the same effort level and the same
fraud level. For example, both the conventional stock option and simple equity contract predicts
an effort level 60 and a fraud level of 100. These treatments were implemented in the laboratory in
a between subject design. Table 2.3 provides a summary of treatments that were predicted to be
equivalent.
The treatment-specifics are as follows: The Simple Equity treatment (i.e. ET ) had little to no
uncertainty regarding the earnings from the investment in the project. However, the Stock Option
treatment (i.e. ST ) had relatively higher uncertainty regarding the earning from the project. The
subjects were told that their earnings depended on whether the final project value was above a
certain threshold amount. If the final project value was greater than the threshold amount, then
the subject-manager’s earnings was the pre-defined share times the difference between the final
project value and the threshold amount. In the case of the Simple Equity treatment, the subject’s
earnings from the project was the pre-defined share times the final value of the project.
16The word treatment or contract is used interchangeably to describe either equity type or stock option type
contracts.
24
Hypothesis
The experimental design provides a means of testing the theoretical predictions. The testable
hypothesis from the theory using experimental data is:
H1: The difference between both effort levels and both fraud levels of any two predicted equivalent
stock option contracts is zero. According to Proposition 1 in Chapter 1, if any two distinct
incentive compensation contracts induce the same level of managerial effort, E∗, then they
also induce the same level of fraud, F ∗. For this hypothesis to be true, both effort levels and
fraud levels must remain unchanged when we compare treatment ET to ST .
2.4 Definition of Data
The experimental data was collected in June 2009, consisting of two incentive contract types. A
total number of seventy-one subjects participated in the experiment. Approximately 55% (39) of
the subjects were males while 45% (32) were females. Although our theory describes a one-shot
game, we allow for learning and feedback by repeating the game for 20 periods. As a result, the
data points collected constituted a panel of 1420 pooled observations.
In each session, we altered some parameters to create the environment of the desired treatment
effect. The definition and description of variables used for our analysis are provided in Table 10 in
the Appendix 3.6. Table 11 in the Appendix provides the summary statistics of the variables. The
first two variables (effort and fraud) are the dependent variables. Properties17 of the two variables
and the estimation methodology will be addressed in a subsequent section.
The next two variables are the treatment (contract dummies) variables. They take the value of
0 or 1 depending on the treatment specification or definition. For example, treatment ST dummy
takes the value of 1 when the option share is 50%, the strike price equals 850 lab dollars and salary is
150 lab dollars. On the other hand the ET dummy takes the value 1 when the option share is 35%,
the strike price equals 0 lab dollars and salary is 120 lab dollars. Thirty-six subjects participated
in the ET treatment while thirty-five subjects participated in the ST treatment.
17The distribution of the effort and fraud are provided in the Appendix. See Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.4: Predicted and Actual Values
Treatment Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Effort Mean Effort Fraud Mean Fraud
ET 60 81∗∗∗ 100 130∗∗∗
[1.091] [4.911]
ST 60 83∗∗∗ 100 154∗∗∗
[1.149] [5.021]
*** Statistically different from the predicted value at the 1% significance level. Standard errors are reported in [ ].
The next variable is a proxy for risk aversion. We constructed an indicator that takes the value 1
if the subject exhibited risk-averse preferences in the gamble game. When the subject chooses more
than five safe choices, then the risk-averse parameter takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The next
variables are feedback variables. The first feedback variable is LAG PENALTY. LAG PENALTY
is the amount of penalty the subject incurred in the previous period. The next feedback variable is
LAG AUDIT and this variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the subject was audited
in the previous period. The last feedback variable is the LAG WEALTH. LAG WEALTH is the
accumulated earnings from the previous rounds. Since our theoretical model is static, we are unable
to make any predictions on the impact of these variables on both effort and fraud.
In addition to the feedback variables, we constructed a variable that proxy for the ability of the
subjects. The ABILITY variable was constructed using the number of questions that the subject
answered correctly. The questions were administered after the participants had completed the task
of reading through the instructions.18 Finally, we control for learning in our experiment using
dummies for each period. However, the estimates of these variables are not reported.
2.5 Results
The results pertain to the experimental design shown in Table 2.3. Table 2.4 contains the point
predictions of effort and fraud for a risk-neutral agent.19 The subjects’ actual mean effort and fraud
levels are also reported with the point predictions in Table 2.4.
18Approximately 54% of the subjects had a score above 3 out of 5 points. Also 41% of the subjects had a score
below 3 points. The overall average score was approximately 3 points.
1920% of our subjects were considered to be risk-neutral. 20% were risk-loving and 60% were risk-averse.
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Columns 2 and 4 contain the predicted effort and fraud values respectively. The corresponding
actual mean effort and fraud values are also reported in columns 3 and 5. In general, the observed
mean values of effort and fraud were higher than the predicted values. Bruner et al. (2008) also
observed mean values that were above or different from their theoretical predictions. For example,
the theoretical predictions of effort and fraud for both treatment ET and ST are 60 and 100
respectively. The observed mean values for treatment ET were 81 and 130 for effort and fraud
respectively. The observed mean values in terms of the effort and fraud levels of treatment ST are
also higher than the predicted values; the actual effort and fraud values are 83 and 154 respectively.
The level of effort induce from the both the ET and the ST treatments appear to be close. The
difference between mean level of fraud across the ET and the ST seems to be large. This preliminary
result may indicative of the stock options potentially generating more than simple equity. Note that
the difference between the actual mean and the predicted effort and fraud values are statistically
different from zero at the 1% significance level. Also note that the standard errors are modest and
the difference in the standard errors between treatment ET and ST are relatively small. Figure 2.1
provides a box plot of effort and fraud data points across the two treatments.20 As Figure 2.1
suggests, the distribution of effort in both the ET and ST treatments appear to be similar, although
the median effort of the ST treatment is relatively higher than the median effort level of the ET
treatment. The distribution of fraud in both treatments also appear to be similar. From the box
plot, it is shown that the median fraud levels of both the ET and ST treatment are the same. It
is striking to note that the median fraud value of both treatments is 100 which is the same as the
predicted fraud level. This evidence provides strong support for our theoretical prediction. Figures
2.2 and 2.3 also provide another dimension of effort and fraud decisions by subject-managers. As
previously noted, our model is a one-shot game, however in the experiment the subject-managers
were asked to repeat their effort and fraud decisions for 20 rounds. To summarize their effort and
fraud decisions over time, we plot average effort and fraud decisions for each period. The plot
of average effort and fraud over time in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 first indicate that average effort and
20The box plot provides a summary of the following statistical measures: median, upper and lower quartiles, and
the minimum and the maximum data values. The box itself contains 50% of the data points. The upper edge of the
box indicates the 75th percentile while the lower edge of the box indicates the 25th percentile of the data. The line
the box indicates the median value of the data.
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Figure 2.1: Note: Box plot graph for contracts predicted to induce effort level of 60 and fraud level
of 100
fraud levels are higher than predicted values. Secondly, the average effort across the ET and ST
treatments appear to be similar. Thirdly, average fraud levels appears to be slightly higher in the
ST treatment after period 9.
2.5.1 Non-parametric Analysis
The non-parametric results are summarized in Table 2.5. The statistical analysis presented herein
examines the difference in median of the average effort and fraud amounts of each subject across the
two treatments.21 The individual effort and fraud choice over 20 periods may not be independently
distributed. However, independence can be achieved by taking the individual averages of effort and
21We impose some structure on our dataset, since we observe 20 data points for each subject. These data points
are likely to be correlated.
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Figure 2.2: Average effort levels of ET and ST treatments across 20 paying rounds
fraud amounts for each treatment. This procedure generates 71 observations for all the treatments.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to examine the validity of our
research hypothesis.
The difference between effort levels for the ET and ST contracts were found to be statistically
not different from zero. Table 2.5 reports p-values of 0.412 and 0.617 from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
and Mann-Whitney U tests respectively. The difference between the fraud levels for the ET and ST
contracts were also found to be statistically not different from zero. The p-values of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Mann-Whitney U tests are 0.227 and 0.144 respectively. These values suggest that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution of the two independent samples
(equity and stock option). The result obtained provides strong support for the our theoretical result
in Chapter 1. The result obtained also confirm that the novel way of mitigating managerial fraud
is through contract design. Although this result should be interpreted with caution, it still provides
some guidance as to how the firm owner can use the design of contracts to mitigate fraud in a cost
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Figure 2.3: Average fraud levels of ET and ST treatments across 20 paying rounds
effective way.
Next, we perform a multivariate analysis to examine whether effort and fraud are the same across
the predicted equivalent contracts while taking into account the effects of other variables such as
risk postures of the subjects. The risk posture variable and feedback variables are introduced for
exploratory purposes.
2.5.2 Multivariate Analysis
The property of our dataset enables us to utilize panel estimation method. The panel data allows
us to control in a more natural way the effects of missing and unobserved variables. Unlike cross-
sectional data, we can also allow for feedback and learning since our data is collected over a number
of periods. The estimated reduced-form equations are:
effortit = κ1ET + κ2ST + κ3RiskAverseit + κ4LagAuditit
+κ5LagPenaltyit + κ6LagWealthit + η1Dit + ϕi + εit (2.9)
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Table 2.5: Predicted and Actual Values
Null Hypothesis Kolmogorov-Smirnov Mann-Whitney U
Test Test
Effort: ET − ST = 0 0.412 0.617
Fraud: ET − ST = 0 0.227 0.144
Result summary Fail to Reject Ho! Fail to Reject Ho!
fraudit = β1ET + β2ST + β3RiskAverseit + β4LagAuditit
+β5LagPenaltyit + β6LagWealthit + η2Dit + γi + it (2.10)
where the subscript i denotes the subject i and the subscript t denotes the period t. κ and β are the
coefficients of the independent variables of the effort and fraud equations respectively. η denotes
the coefficient of the vector of period dummies. Finally εit and it are the error terms of the effort
and fraud equation respectively.
The estimation of the effort equation utilizes the random-effects model while the estimation
of the fraud equation utilizes the random-effects two-tailed Tobit model.22 To assess the validity
of our theoretical prediction, a simple inference test was implemented to examine the difference
between the coefficients of equivalent contracts. For our theoretical prediction to remain valid, the
difference between coefficients of the equivalent contracts must not be statistically different from
zero. The results are summarized in Tables 2.6 through 2.7 for the effort and fraud equations
respectively. The main variable of interest in these regressions is the treatment dummy, which may
either be ET or ST . Since there are only two treatments, one of the dummies is not included in the
regression. For our research hypothesis to remain true, then our variable of interest must not be
statistically different from zero in both regression equations. The results in columns (2) and (3) of
Tables Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provided appealing results. The main distinction become columns (2) and
(3) is that, the regression result in column (3) in both tables control for period effects. However, the
results associated withe the period effects are not reported. Hereon, the discussion of our results
is referenced from column (3) for both the effort and fraud estimated equations. The coefficients
22This approach was utilized because of the mass at zero fraud and the maximum amount of fraud. This OLS
distributional assumptions are violated and thus applying least squares to the data leads to biased and inconsistent
estimates. In our pooled data 252 observations were found at the left censor and 174 were found at the right censor.
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Table 2.6: Reduced-Form Regression of Effort Equation
dependent variable: effort
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 81.07*** 78.66***
[4.082] [5.282]
ET -2.088
[6.021]
ST 2.088
[6.021]
Period Effects N Y
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R2 0.09 0.09
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
of the treatment dummy, ET in the effort and fraud equations are −2.09 and −31.91 respectively.
The sign of these coefficients provide information about the direction of effort and fraud relative
to the ST treatment. The negative sign suggests that stocks on average is inducing more effort
and fraud than simple equity. Since the coefficient of the treatment variable in both the effort and
fraud equations are not statistically significant, the cannot the null of our hypothesis that there is
no difference in effort and fraud choice under both ET and ST treatments. Therefore, the punch-
line from the results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 is that, simple equity and stock option contracts induce
similar behavior. The above results generally confirm that contracts that are theoretically predicted
to induce the same level of effort and the same level of fraud are also similar in a behavioral sense.
The distinct characteristics of the payoff tables for the stock option treatment and the simple
equity treatment even make our result very profound. The main difference in the strategy space of
the two treatments is that, the stock option treatment had a relatively steep payoff table while the
simple equity payoff table was relatively flat. Yet, the differences in the average effort and fraud
choices between treatment ET and ST were statistically not different from each other. In fact, the
variance of both the effort and fraud levels were quite similar. Figure 2.1 provides evidence of this
claim.
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Table 2.7: Reduced-Form Regression of Fraud Equation
dependent variable: fraud
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 117.74*** 124.29***
[22.247] [26.791]
ET -31.91
[31.549]
ST 31.50
[31.622]
Period Effects N Y
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R2 0.11 0.13
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
2.5.3 Robustness Check
This section provides robustness check in two ways. Firstly by examining the subject’s choices of
effort and fraud over sub-periods, and secondly by estimating a propensity model which examines
whether subjects were more inclined to commit fraud under a specific incentive contract among
other incentive contracts that were examined.
Now consider the first approach. It is typical to observe changes in the choices (effort and fraud)
of subjects over repeated games. Since we repeat the one-shot game for 20 rounds, we also report
the test for equivalence for different period blocks or sub-samples of our dataset. We report these
results in Tables 2.11 and 2.12.
Results from Tables 2.11 and 2.12 are fairly consistent with full sample result of behavioral equiva-
lence, especially in period block I, II, and IV. Four dummy variables were constructed by interacting
period block dummies and the treatment dummy (i.e. stock option contract dummy).23 The coeffi-
cient of these dummies have to be statistically not different from zero for our hypothesis to remain
true. We found support of equivalence between contracts that were predicted to induce the same
level of effort and fraud. We found the strongest evidence of equivalence in period blocks I, II,
23Four period block dummies were constructed. Period block I dummy ranges 1 to 5. Period block II dummy
ranges from period 6 to 10, period block III dummy ranges from period 11 to 15,and period block IV dummy ranges
from period 16 to 20.
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Table 2.8: Robustness Check: Effort Regression
dependent variable: effort
Constant 80.11***
[4.019]
ST x Period 1-5 -0.75
[6.735]
ST x Period 6-10 1.03
[6.184]
ST x Period 11-15 3.61
[5.798]
ST x Period 16-20 4.46
[5.924]
Period 1-5 1.56
[1.795]
Period 6-10 1.94
[1.795]
Period 11-15 0.33
[1.442]
Period 16-20
Number of Obs. 1420
R2 0.12
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
and IV. We rejected the null of behavioral equivalence in only one of the period blocks; the period
block III induced a higher fraud level than the other period rounds although the effort level was
statistically not different from zero. The results columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.12 capture the presence
of end period effect. The results indicate the subjects chose higher amounts of fraud during the last
rounds than all other rounds.24
Now consider the second approach. The propensity model is estimated using a panel Logit
model. Although this analysis was not a direct test of our research hypothesis, it provided an
opportunity to check whether fraud was more likely under a stock option contract versus a simple
equity contract. The dependent variable in this model took a value of 1 if the subject chose a
positive fraud amount. A regression analysis was performed by regressing the dependent variable
on the same set of independent variables as in Table 2.7. The results of these analyses are reported
24This result also shows the importance of controlling for end period effects in our estimated model.
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Table 2.9: Robustness Check: Fraud Regression
dependent variable: fraud
RE 2T-Tobit
Constant 180.23*** 174.72***
[23.738] [16.977]
ST x Period 1-5 9.29 6.66
[33.789] [23.323]
ST x Period 6-10 1.75 3.83
[33.751] [23.929]
ST x Period 11-15 69. 95** 44.62**
[33.85] [22.340]
ST x Period 16-20 46.32 39.564
[33.738] [24.931]
Period 1-5 -73.68*** -51.67***
[13.903] [9.682]
Period 6-10 -53.05*** -40.556***
[13.819] [10.229]
Period 11-15 -123.82*** -83.06***
[14.123] [9.142]
Period 16-20
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R2 0.14 0.15
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
in Table 2.10 in Appendix 3.6. The coefficients are the regular Logit coefficients, not marginal
effects. The signs of the coefficients can be interpreted as directional responses.
Now consider the likelihood of fraud between the simple equity and stock option contracts.
Holding predicted effort constant, the results suggested that there was no statistical difference in
the likelihood of fraud between the simple equity and stock option contracts. This result re-confirms
the strong evidence of behavioral equivalence between the ET and ST contracts.
2.5.4 Other Results
Next, results from the other co-variates are discussed. The results discussed are associated with
Tables 2.11 and 2.12. All the exploratory variables were found not to account for any variation in
the level of effort chosen by the subjects. The reduced fraud model indicates that some variation
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Table 2.10: Logit Model Results: Propensity Model of Managerial Fraud
dependent variable: fraud = 0 or 1
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 3.36*** 1.94
(0.000) (0.030)
ET -0.66
(0.357)
ST 1.07
(0.150)
Risk Averse 0.46
(0.344)
Lagged Audit 1.54***
(0.000)
Lagged Wealth 0.002***
(0.017)
Ability -0.15
(0.438)
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R2 0.13 0.18
Notes: p-values are in ( ). *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
in fraud is attributable to risk aversion. Column 2 in Table 2.12 show that subjects that were
classified as risk-averse in the conventional stock option treatment chose less fraud. This result is
captured by the interactive term between ST and the risk-averse dummy variables. A rather odd
result, is that subjects that were classified as risk-averse in the simple-equity treatment chose more
fraud than less risk averse subjects. Our empirical results reported in column 3 of Table 2.12 also
show evidence of feedback effects in the fraud regression. We found the odd but often observed
“gambler’s fallacy” behavior.25 This outcome partially explains why the observed fraud amounts
are lower than predicted in low detection regimes and higher than predicted fraud amounts in high
detection regimes. The prevalence of the gambler’s fallacy is often the reason why investors have the
tendency to sell stock that have appreciated and hold on stocks that have plummeted in value. The
coefficient of lagged audit variable was 76.21 and this result was significant at the 1% significance
level. This implied that when the subjects were audited in the previous round, the subjects were
25Croson and Sundali (2005) also found existence of the gambler’s fallacy using field data in a casino.
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Table 2.11: Reduced-Form Regression of Effort Equation
dependent variable: effort
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 78.02*** 89.22***
[6.005] [6.271]
ET -3.67 -1.407
[7.380] [5.840]
ST
Risk Averse 3.673 2.287
[3.964] [2.664]
ET x Risk Averse
ST x Risk Averse -2.574
[5.984]
Lagged Audit -1.250
[2.016]
Lagged Wealth -0.001
[0.004]
Ability -1.526
[1.405]
Period Effects Y Y
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R-squared 0.10 0.15
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
more inclined to commit more fraud in the subsequent rounds. The lag of wealth was not found to
be correlated with the choice of fraud level. Finally, the ability variable was also not found to be
correlated with the amount of fraud chosen by the subject.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter provided a robust test of the theoretical model in Chapter 1 by using an experimental
technique. The testable research hypothesis that fall out from the theoretical model in Chapter 1
asserts that the difference in both the effort levels and both the fraud levels of any two contracts
that are predicted to be equivalent is zero. The experimental test focused on whether there was
evidence of behavioral equivalence.
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Table 2.12: Reduced-Form Regression of Fraud Equation
dependent variable: fraud
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 152.16*** 166.06***
[31.99] [44.529]
ET -96.95***
[39.907]
ST 33.47
[32.511]
Risk Averse 60.66** 12.03
[27.174] [19.877]
ET x Risk Averse
ST x Risk Averse -108.59***
[40.779]
Lagged Audit 76.21***
[14.311]
Lagged Wealth 0.007
[0.034]
Ability -7.30
[8.157]
Period Effects Y Y
Number of Obs. 1420 1420
R2 0.14 0.21
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
Our experimental approach produced strong results in support of our research hypothesis. Both
the non-parametric and parametric analyses yielded consistent results. The results from the para-
metric analyses were even robust after controlling for risk effects. When we contrasted the conven-
tional stock option contract with simple equity contract, we found that both contract types induced
the same level of fraud. Also, the difference in effort levels between the conventional stock option
and simple equity contracts were generally consistent and statistically not different from zero. All
in all, the experimental test showed evidence of behavioral equivalence.
The analyses presented in this paper provided an answer to the following question: Do incentive
contracts that are predicted to be equivalent induce similar behavior? The answer to this question
is yes. In support of this answer, we found no difference in both effort and fraud levels of the
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contracts that were predicted to be equivalent. With respect to the contracts that were examined,
we can conclude that there are no other contracts that can induce relatively greater effort and also
generate relatively less fraud.
Based on the above results, one implication stands out. The evidence of behavioral equivalence in
support of the theory re-confirm that, there is no way to design a stock option contract that reduces
fraud without also reducing effort. Thus, the recent trend in the U.S. that shows firms switching
from stock option to equity type contracts may not have any significant impact on managerial fraud.
The prescription for mitigating fraud that is presented in this experimental analysis is quite
straightforward. Beyond enforcing strict accounting standards, firm owners cannot reduce fraud
without reducing effort from the manager through contract design. Perhaps, firm owners will be
better off choosing stock options because they are relatively cheaper to the firm owner than simple
equity. This result is profound in the sense that although the characteristics of simple equity and
stock option contracts are dissimilar, they are still capable of inducing similar behavior.
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Chapter 3
Tax Evasion: Progressive and Regressive
Tax Regimes
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3.1 Introduction
Previous chapters examined the effect of various incentive contracts on the incidence of managerial
fraud. Chapter 3 proceeds by investigating another form of fraud, tax evasion, under two tax
schemes. This chapter goes on to investigate how misreporting of income differs across progressive
and regressive tax regimes in an experimental setting.
Beginning with Friedland et al. (1978), there has been increased interest in the use of experi-
mental methods to study tax compliance. These experimental studies (Spicer and Becker (1980),
Spicer and Everett (1982), Alm et al. (1989), Beck et al. (1991), and Alm et al. (1992)) have
provided a platform to examine various prescriptions for increasing tax compliance including the
positive effects of perceptions, uncertainty, frequent audits, social norms, and public goods. Al-
though the aforementioned papers differ significantly in detail, they all utilize tax systems that are
primarily regressive (i.e. proportional tax rate) in nature. This paper experimentally attempts to
test whether tax compliance behavior is different under either the progressive or the regressive tax
systems assuming both tax systems are revenue equivalent.1
There are salient reasons to believe that tax compliance decisions may differ under the progressive
and the regressive tax regimes. The major distinction between the two tax schemes is that, while
the progressive tax scheme shifts a higher tax burden on the rich, the regressive on the other
hand shifts a higher tax burden on the poor. Behaviorally, tax compliance may differ across the
two tax schemes because of framing-effects. The framing-effects may increase the importance of
one’s consideration of fairness and inequality aversion on tax compliance decision. Finally, the
risk preferences of taxpayers may also induce strategic behavior across the two tax schemes. The
compounding effects of these factors on the tax evasion decision provide enough reasons to believe
that there may be potential differences in tax compliance behavior across the two tax schemes. An
experimental approach is well suited for this form of investigation.
The relevance of this experimental study stems from the fact that there are fundamental differ-
1Field studies have mainly focused on the efficiency cost of the progressive tax systems due to distortions of
individual’s labor supply decision and not evasion decision. To mention a few, Burtless (1987), Ballard (1988), Triest
(1990), MaCurdy et al. (1990), Triest (1990), and Bosworth and Burtless (1992) focused primarily on the distortions
of individual’s labor supply. A bulk of these papers suggest that labor supply is less responsive to taxation (i.e.
progressive tax systems) than had previously been thought.
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ences in the tax systems across the world. Mitra et al. (1998) pointed out that income tax schedules
in most of the industrial societies (including the OECD countries) are marginal rate progressive.2
However, the tax schemes used in these countries sometimes differ in the degree of progressivity
(or regressivity). The broad spectrum of tax schemes across the world is certainly not a new phe-
nomenon. Even within the US, the tax systems across the states generally lack uniformity. For
example, the southern region is relatively less progressive than the northeastern region. Chernick
(2005) claims that overall state-local tax systems were regressive. He further acknowledges that the
most progressive state-local tax system was more than three times as progressive as the least, in
1991.
Most often, the use of these tax systems have ignited vigorous debates on how tax burdens
should be distributed, and less focused on how taxpayers respond in terms of tax compliance. The
latter directly affects taxing authorities (or governments) in at least two ways; enforcement cost
and revenue collected. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) confirm that the government spends about
10% of its total tax revenue on tax enforcement alone. Moreover, the US Internal Revenue Service
estimates that about 17% of due income taxes are not paid.
With the exception of the progressive and the regressive tax schemes, many factors have been
considered to explain tax compliance behavior. If the fundamental tax scheme is important in
determining tax compliance behavior, then tax authorities would carefully consider the type of tax
regimes they operate. In doing so, taxing authorities may minimize the deadweight costs which
may be in the form of administrative, compliance, or behavioral costs. The differences in tax
schemes used across different taxing jurisdictions may be motivated by self-serving individual state
incentives. Despite these differences, there seems to be little grasp on the direct implications on
taxpayers within the state (in terms of tax compliance). To date, it is still uncertain whether a
relatively progressive tax regime (hereon PTR) may drive higher non-compliance than a relatively
regressive tax regime (hereon RTR).
To answer this question, the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) expected utility model is adopted to
2In the US, the state individual income tax in most states is progressive in nature. For example, 33 states have a
progressive individual income state while 7 states utilize a flat rate tax (relatively regressive). On the contrary, about
32 states utilize a flat rate state corporate income tax. Approximately 12 states utilize a progressive state corporate
income tax.
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make predictions. The predictions are then tested in an experimental setting. This model which has
widely been used in the tax compliance literature examines the behavior of taxpayers by comparing
the benefit and the expected cost of under-reporting in a framework that utilizes a flat tax rate.
Most studies that spurred off from this model have generally assessed the potential factors that
inhibit truthful reporting using the same setup (a flat tax rate) with the exception of Koskela
(1983). His theoretical note focuses on the sensitivity of the penalty scheme under a tax schedule
which is progressive.
A bulk of the experimental studies on tax compliance behavior used a flat tax rate to examine
different questions. Alm et al. (1992) for example investigate the impact of uncertainty about fine
rate, tax rate, and the audit rate on tax compliance. Alm et al. (1999) also present experimental
evidence of voting on tax, audit, and fine rates on tax compliance. Fortin et al. (2007), introduce
peer effects or social interaction effects to examine tax reporting behavior. Feld and Tyran (2002)
assessed tax compliance behavior by introducing voting to approve or renege the proposal of a fine.
Cummings et al. (2006) investigated the compliance behavior of individuals when evasion can be
accomplished via multiple items. Although the above papers provide reasonable game-simulation
environment of the tax compliance process, the tax function or structure in these settings are a
gross simplification of the tax structures often used in reality.
However, a handful of other studies like Guth and Mackscheidt (1985) and Becker et al. (1987)
have introduced progressive tax schedules, but pay little attention to the impact of progressive tax
schedules on tax compliance behavior. Becker et al. (1987) for example investigated the impact of
public transfers on tax compliance behavior. They found strong positive correlation between the
tax compliance and increase in an individual’s transfer payment. This implies that if a taxpayer
receives less transfer payment than others, then he or she would be more inclined to evade taxes.
This is parallel to the result of Spicer and Becker (1980) who found that the perception of tax
burden compared to that of others played a critical role in changing tax compliance behavior.3
The work done herein contributes to the literature by introducing the PTR and the RTR in
an experimental setting to compare the predicted tax compliance behavior. By introducing the
3Both the PTR and RTR inject similar framing issue.
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PTR and the RTR, this paper will address the following question: Is there any difference in tax
compliance behavior between a progressive and a regressive tax regime assuming both are revenue
equivalent?
Several implications arise if either the PTR or the RTR is confirmed to induce higher tax
compliance distortions. Higher tax compliance distortions will directly affect revenue collections.
When revenue collections decline as a result of lower tax compliance, the administrative cost of
the tax system may potentially increase. This means that more resources may be dedicated to
monitoring of income reporting. As cost of monitoring of tax reporting increases, tax revenue
collections may fall since more resources may be used to collect the same amount of tax revenue.
Furthermore, low tax compliance which may lead to low revenue collections by governments can
result in dire financial crisis as in the case of Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2002. The threat of
financial crises is enough to foster the search for mechanisms that may encourage tax compliance.
The mechanisms that can potentially achieve this goal include strict enforcement mechanisms and
tax schemes, the focus of this paper.
As a benchmark, an income reporting model is provided to make inferences about tax compliance
behavior. The difference in tax compliance behavior between the PTR and the RTR is simply
modeled by allowing the marginal tax rate to change along with a tax subsidy (or lump-sum tax).
To make the comparison between the PTR and the RTR concrete, the degree of progressivity (or
regressivity) of the tax structure is adjusted such that under full tax compliance, the expected
revenue to the government is held constant. Assuming risk neutrality, the model predicts that
a utility maximizing taxpayer should comply less under the RTR versus the PTR. This result is
predicated on the the assumption that the penalty rate is charged on the evaded taxes.4 The
theoretical prediction from this model is tested in an experimental setting.
The experimental setting which allows us to control for the enforcement, tax rates, income level,
and decision environment are fairly similar to that of previous studies. The experiment consisted of
4Koskela (1983) showed that the nonequivalence of tax evasion depends on whether penalty is charged on unde-
clared income or evaded taxes. Goerke (2003) also showed that tax progressivity also influences tax evasion. In his
setting, the nonequivalence in tax evasion does not only depend on the whether fine is on evaded tax or undeclared
income. Goerke (2003) pointed out that tax evasion also depends on whether taxpayers have to declare their income
or tax payments.
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two main players, the tax authority and the taxpayer. The role of the tax authority was computerized
in Ztree (Fishbacher (1999)). Subjects from the University of Tennessee were invited to play the
role of the taxpayers. In each phase of the experiment, the subject-taxpayers were introduced to
a tax regime which varied in the degree of progressivity (or regressivity). The subjects were then
asked to report their income. The reported income was checked at some exogenous probability. In
each of the experimental sessions conducted, the tax systems were anticipated to generate equivalent
revenue if subjects reported truthfully. The decision stage was repeated for a number of rounds.
It is important to note that the theoretical model implemented in the laboratory allows for
only one corner solution; no tax compliance. This is important, because approximately 51% of all
observations are censored at the left tail of the compliance distribution. The main finding in this
paper is related to the possibility of differences in tax compliance behavior between the PTR and the
RTR. The experimental result confirms that there is no difference in the tax compliance behavior
between the PTR and the RTR. The result remained robust across different model specifications.
The result of no difference in tax compliance behavior is surprising. Perhaps the result of no
difference in tax compliance behavior reaffirms how tax culture within a region potentially plays a
far more superior role in determining tax compliance behavior. As observed in the experimental
study by Cummings et al. (2004), individuals in Botswana and US were more compliant than those
in South Africa; a result that is clearly beyond the conventional economics of crime. Cummings
et al. (2004) proposed that if individual attitudes toward tax compliance are a function of social
and cultural noms, then enhancing these norms may be a desirable policy.
The experimental results also indicated the tax compliance decision by taxpayers within the
PTR and the RTR were motivated by other economic and non-economic factors. Aside from the
main variable of interest, the gender of the subjects was found to influence overall tax compliance
rate. The compliance rate of males were found to be significantly less than females. Tax compliance
was also driven by factors such as fairness and inequality aversion. The experimental result provided
strong support of fairness effects. Thus, subjects that considered taxes to be fair complied more
relative to subjects that considered taxes to be unfair. Subjects with high inequality aversion
complied less; a result that appears to be driven by subjects that participated in the RTR rather than
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the PTR. Risk aversion also played an important role in determining tax compliance behavior. In
general, tax compliance was found to be higher for relatively risk-averse subjects. Finally, feedback
variables produced the gambler’s fallacy result of less tax compliance whenever the subjects were
audited in the previous round.
The next section of this paper presents the theoretical model, which was drawn from the Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972) model. It is followed by the experimental design and empirical results.
The conclusions are presented in the last section.
3.2 A Model of Tax Compliance Behavior
Consider a simple income reporting model where the objective is for a taxpayer to maximize his
or her expected income by choosing how much of his or her income to report. In this model, the
only incentive for the economic agent to report their true income is the non-zero probability of not
being caught and sanctioned. The focus here is to emphasize the potential differences in behaviors
under different tax systems (in terms of the progressivity of the tax schedule). The change in
progressivity of a tax schedule and tax compliance has been previously addressed by Koskela (1983)
in a theoretical note. Koskela (1983) shows that the tax compliance is sensitive to the nature of
the penalty schemes if the taxpayer is caught evading his or her taxes.5 The sensitivity of tax
compliance regarding the nature of penalty schemes forms the basis for the two benchmark models
used in this experiment.
The sequence of events is as follows: At period 1, agents earn an income, wki , where the super-
script k = 1 or 2, such that w1i < w
2
i . During period 2, agents are randomly given tax regime, tj
which differ by either the progressivity or the regressivity of the tax. The suffix, j distinguishes the
tax regimes. The prevailing tax regime determines the tax schedule that is used to calculate the tax
burden of each agent. Next, in period 3, agents are required to report their income for the purposes
of calculating their tax burden. Agents can choose to under-report their true income in this period.
By choosing to under-report their true income, they are able to reduce their tax burden. Finally
5This assertion holds true even when the expected tax revenues of government or the expected utility of taxpayer
is held constant.
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in period 4, the reported income is checked at some probability, p. The probability of detection is
exogenously determined, which implies that it is independent of the reported income. The details
of each period are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
3.2.1 Model Setup
The model consists of a tax agency and risk-neutral economic agents that play the role of taxpayers.
The taxpayer i earns a taxable income of wki ∈ WK , where WK is the set of K attainable income
levels by the taxpayer. While the taxpayer knows his or her true income the tax authority does
not. The taxpayer i must choose how much of his or her income to report. The reported amount
is denoted by ri such that ri ∈ [0, wi] . This means that there are no opportunities to report more
than the taxpayer’s true income.
The subject’s tax burden is determined according to the prevailing tax system. The index j = P
represents the progressive tax regime while the index j = R represents the regressive tax regime.
Let tj(ri) be the tax revenue function; for simplicity the tax revenue function is assumed to be
linear. Mathematically, a linear progressive tax function is described by
tj(ri) = −αj + βj · ri (3.1)
where the parameter −αj can be interpreted as the amount of tax subsidy. The parameter βj can be
interpreted as the marginal tax rate. For a progressive tax function, the average tax rate, denoted
by ATRj has to be increasing with increments in reported income, that is
dATRj
dri
=
αj
r2i
> 0 (3.2)
For a regressive, i.e. dATRjdri < 0, the parameter αj has to be a positive value and this parameter
can be interpreted as the amount of lump-sum tax. To make the comparison between the PTR and
the RTR concrete, we posit that the revenue generated from both tax regimes must be equivalent
under truthful reporting. Since we assume that tP (wi) = tR(wi), then it is implied that βP > βR
in order for revenue equivalence to hold. The condition wi > tj(wi) for all wi is also imposed. This
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assumption is necessary to ensure that there is no bankruptcy.
Finally, there is an exogenous probability, p, of being caught when a taxpayer under-reports
and faces a fine denoted by X(·), which is assumed to be convex. The components that determine
the penalty schedule are not consistent across the tax compliance literature. For example, in the
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, the penalty when caught under-reporting income depends on
the difference between the true income, wi and the reported income, ri. Other studies like Yitzhaki
(1974) assume that economic agents are penalized on taxes owed in lieu of unreported income. To
conform with penalty schemes in reality and studies like Yitzhaki (1974), a penalty scheme that is
charged on the evaded taxes rather than the undeclared taxes is adopted.
Model
Assuming risk neutrality, the general objective of each taxpayer i is to maximize his or her expected
utility by choosing ri. When the penalty is charged on evaded taxes, the objective of the taxpayer
i is
max
ri
EU(I) = max
ri
[wi − tj(ri)− pX (tj(wi)− tj(ri))] (3.3)
The corresponding necessary condition for an interior solution is
−1 + pX ′ (tj(wi)− tj(ri)) = 0 (3.4)
Substituting equation 3.1 into 3.4 yields
−1 + pX ′ ((wi − ri)βj) = 0 (3.5)
The sufficient condition for an interior solution is
D = −pX ′′βj < 0. (3.6)
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The optimal report, r∗ = r∗(β, p, w) is implicitly defined by equation (3.5). The following compar-
ative statics are immediate
dr
dβj
= −pθX
′′(wi − ri)
D
> 0 (3.7)
dr
dαj
= 0 (3.8)
dr
dp
= −X
′
D
> 0 (3.9)
dr
dw
= −pX
′′βj
D
> 0. (3.10)
The comparative static result in equation (3.7) shows that tax compliance is increasing with respect
to an increase in βj . However, the level of income reporting will remain unchanged when the level of
tax subsidy increases. According to equations (3.9)and (3.10), an increase in the level of detection
probability and income is shown to increase tax compliance respectively.
The assumption of revenue neutrality under full tax compliance is key in assessing the effect of
changes in the progressivity (or regressivity) of the tax schedule. This means that the change in the
expected tax revenue of the tax authority must be equal to zero, i.e. dE(T ) = 0 when parameters
αj and βj are altered accordingly. The change in reported income due to a change the αj and βj
can be decomposed as follows:
dri = rαjdαj + rβjdβj (3.11)
where the subscripts are the partial derivatives. Equation (3.11) suggests that the change in income
reporting behavior is explained by changes in tax subsidy (lump-sum tax) and the marginal tax
rate. Since rα = 0, hence the direction of tax compliance to the changes in αj and βj that keeps
expected revenue unchanged under full tax compliance is simply determined by
dri
dβj
= rβj = −
pX ′′(wi − ri)
D0
> 0. (3.12)
The result from equation (3.12) shows that only the marginal tax rate, βj influences the tax compli-
ance behavior and not the parameter αj . Thus, the prediction of tax compliance decision is solely
dependent on changes in the marginal tax rate.
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3.3 Experimental Design
The motivation for the experiment is premised on the predicted differences in tax compliance be-
havior from the standard model of income reporting. Should taxpayers behave purely according to
the compliance gamble, we anticipate that subjects would comply more under the PTR than the
RTR. This prediction is directly obtained from equations (3.7) and (3.12). Hence, the experiment
has some merits in uncovering the behavioral response of taxpayers under different tax incentives.
In the subsequent section, the basic experimental design is introduced along with the parameter
values of the experiment.
3.3.1 Basic Design
The experiment was performed to compare tax compliance behavior under the PTR and the RTR.
According to the theoretical model, tax compliance decision solely depends on the marginal tax rate.
In the spirit of this result, an experiment that imposes different marginal tax rates on different in-
come groups is created. Different marginal tax rates are used on different income groups in order
to appropriately simulate the PTR and the RTR. The experiment was designed and programmed
in Ztree. The inexperienced subjects used in this experiment were volunteers from different aca-
demic backgrounds.6 Approximately 93% of these volunteers have had some prior experience with
experiments.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at The University of
Tennessee. All entries in this experiment were recorded by the subjects via a mouse and keyboard at
their respective computer terminals. The instructions of the experiment are included in Appendix
3.6.
The subjects that participated in this experiment appeared to understand the setting.7 Since
the University of Zurich’s Ztree program does not allow subjects to review past instructions, a hard
copy of the instructions of the experiment were provided to the subjects. Subjects were not allowed
to communicate with each other during the experiment.
6They were inexperienced in that they had not participated in this experiment before.
7Amajority of the participants chose a rating above 3 (between a range of 0 and 5) for the clarity of the instructions.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events in the Experiment
The experiment is not intended to replicate all the complexities with the income tax reporting
process. The experiment consisted of several sessions and each of the experiments had the same basic
structure. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical illustration of the sequence of events in this experiment.
A typical session lasted about an hour. Each session consisted of four phases and a questionnaire.
Each of the phases consisted of five paying rounds. The replication of these rounds was intended
for the subjects to learn about their decisions and also obtain feedback on their previous decisions.
Subjects that participated in the experiment were told to play the role of taxpayers in order
to frame the experiment. The role of the tax agency was computerized. At the beginning of each
phase of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned either a LOW-type or a HIGH-type. The
LOW-type subject was given an income of 50 lab dollars while the HIGH-type was given an income
of 100 lab dollars. The audit process was random. The subjects were well informed about the
audit rate and the penalties. These parameters were fixed in each of the sessions. In this controlled
environment, the participants were simply confronted with a simple task. Subjects were given the
opportunity to decide how much of their income they wanted to declare.8 Subjects paid no taxes on
unreported income, however they were told that there was a 10% chance that their report will be
8An example of the screen shot of the income reporting decision stage is shown in Figure 45. At the top of the
screen, the subjects were given the selected tax schedule. At the bottom of the screen, the subjects were provided a
summary of the previous decisions. After the subjects have inputted their reported income, they must click on the
declare button to file their taxes. Once the declare button is clicked, their decision cannot be reverted. Immediately
after they clicked the declare button, their respective tax shares were calculated and automatically deducted from
their earned income.
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Table 3.1: The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions
Option A Option B Expected Payoff Difference
1/10 of $5.00, 9/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$2.05
2/10 of $5.00, 8/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$1.6
3/10 of $5.00, 7/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$1.15
4/10 of $5.00, 6/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$0.70
5/10 of $5.00, 5/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed -$0.25
6/10 of $5.00, 4/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $0.20
7/10 of $5.00, 3/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $0.65
8/10 of $5.00, 2/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $1.1
9/10 of $5.00, 1/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $1.55
10/10 of $5.00, 0/10 of $0.50 $3.00 guaranteed $2.00
checked. If the subject’s report was checked, all unreported income was discovered and the subject
paid a penalty equal to unpaid taxes times a penalty factor of 2. Before the beginning of the
paying rounds, a number of practice rounds were administered to allow the subjects to familiarize
themselves with the experiment. These practice rounds are important because they ensure that any
kind of confusion in the experiment is minimized. The payoff of each subject in each earning round
was determined according to
pii =

ei + ri − tj(ri) if not caught
ei + ri − tj(ri)− P (·) if caught
where ei is the amount of unreported income (evasion), ri is the reported income amount, tj(ri)
(j = P or R) is the tax revenue function, and P (·) is the penalty function. The penalty function,
P (·), is specified such that it is a function of evaded taxes. Hence, P (·) describes a penalty schedule
that depends on evaded taxes. Before the start of the experiment, the subjects were first asked to
participate in a gamble choice exercise to elicit their risk preferences or risk postures. This exercise
was done since the subject’s risk postures [Cummings et al. (2006)] may affect their decision to
evade. The Holt and Laury (2002) methodology was adopted and used as a guide in classifying
subjects as either being risk averse or not. The structure of the lottery incentive is provided in
Table 3.1. The subjects were offered two options, namely Option A and Option B. This task
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Table 3.2: Experimental Design
Tax System Low Revenue (LRR) High Revenue (HRR)
BASE T1 T2
PTR T3 T4
RTR T5 T6
required that the subjects choose between ten individual gambles, that paid either 0.50 or 5 lab
dollars in Option A, and a guaranteed amount of 3 lab dollars in Option B. The gambles vary in
their respective probabilities of winning the large prize. Following Holt and Laury (2002), the degree
of risk aversion is determined by the number of same choices that the subjects selected. After this
task was completed, the main experiment was implemented.
The experimental design is shown in Table 3.2. Each session (treatment) varied according to the
tax regime which may be either progressive (PTR), regressive (RTR) or proportional (BASE). The
BASE treatment replicates the proportional tax experiments that have been previously done. In fact
the BASE treatment is a replication of the experimental design of Alm et al. (1992). Within each of
these sessions, two revenue targets were introduced, namely, low revenue requirement (hereon LRR)
and high revenue requirement (hereon HRR). Across these sessions, the LRR (HRR) generates the
same amount of revenue in the BASE, PTR and RTR treatments. The LRR generates 30 lab dollars
and the HRR generates 45 lab dollars if the subjects report truthfully.
At the end of the tax experiment, subjects were asked to participate in a short survey. The ques-
tionnaire included questions on demographics and personal opinions. The questionnaire provided
further control variables in the regression analysis.
There were eight sessions total, each having 16 to 18 subjects. Subjects that participated in the
experiment earned about $16. The earnings depended solely on their performance in the experiment.
The subjects were paid in cash privately at the end of the experiment.
Assuming all the subject participants report truthfully, revenue generated should be equivalent
across each tax regime treatments for the LRR (30 lab dollars) and the HRR ( 45 lab dollars)
respectively. In treatments 1 and 2 (or T1 and T2), subjects were asked to report their income in a
proportional tax system (BASE). Subjects that received an income of 50 and 100 lab dollars both
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Table 3.3: Experimental Parameter Values
Tax Systems Income ATR under LRR (30) ATR under HRR (45)
PTR 50 0.18 0.25
100 0.21 0.33
RTR 50 0.23 0.39
100 0.19 0.26
BASE 50 0.2 0.3
100 0.2 0.3
Notes: Table summarizes the average tax rate associated with the income of the subject-taxpayer. BASE represents
the proportional tax treatment.
paid 2 cents on each reported lab dollar in the LRR and 3 cents in the HRR. The order of the LRR
and HRR treatments within each session was randomized. Each of these treatments lasted for 5
rounds before it was altered to another treatment. There were 20 paying rounds in each session.
The parameter values are listed in Table 3.3.
In treatments 3 and 4 (or T3 and T4), the subjects were asked to decide how much of their
income to report under the PTR. Subjects that received an income of 50 lab dollars paid 18 cents
and 25 cents in the LRR and HRR treatments respectively for each dollar of reported income. On
the other hand, the subjects that received 100 lab dollars paid 21 cents and 33 cents in the LRR
and HRR treatments respectively for each dollar of reported income. The information about the
tax rate each income group received was public knowledge. The relative tax burden on high income
subjects in this treatment was higher than the low income subjects. Thus, low income types knew
the tax rate of high income types and vice versa. In treatments 5 and 6 (or T5 and T6), subjects
faced the RTR where the relative tax burden of the low income subjects was higher than the high
income subjects. For example, if the subject received an income of 50 lab dollars, the subject paid 23
cents and 39 cents in the LRR and HRR treatments respectively for each dollar of reported income.
However, the high income subjects paid 19 cents and 25 cents in the LRR and HRR treatments
respectively for each dollar of reported income.
As with the revenue mechanism treatments, the auditing rounds in each of these sessions were
randomized. The auditing or detection rate was 10%. The income level of the subjects were also
randomized in each phase of the experiment.
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Table 3.4: Tax Compliance Predictions
PTR RTR PTR vs RTR
βLj < β
H
j β
L
j > β
H
j β
P
j > β
R
j
Model full evasion full evasion full evasion
Inequality Averse CRL ≤ CRH ? CRP ≥ CRR
Risk Averse CRL ≤ CRH CRL ≥ CRH CRP ≥ CRR
Risk Loving ? ? ?
Notes: CRL stands for compliance rate for a low income taxpayer and CRH stands for compliance rate for a high
income taxpayer.
3.3.2 Testable Hypothesis
Recall that the fundamental focus in this paper is the test on the behavioral differences between
the PTR and the RTR. Based on the self-interested theoretical framework previously discussed, the
following predictions can be tested. It is hypothesized that taxpayers should comply more under
the PTR than the RTR. The configuration of the experimental parameters are similar to parameter
values in the real world and previous studies. In theory, a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer
would report zero income. However, other things being equal, the incentive to report truthfully is
greater for taxpayers facing a higher marginal tax rate. To reconcile the theory and the experimental
setting, a prediction of a weak inequality between the PTR and the RTR is established. In that
sense, we should anticipate (weak) higher compliance rates in treatments T3 (T4), than in session
T5 (T6). A summary of the predictions are summarized in Table 3.4.
Beyond the predictive power of the theoretical model discussed previously, the PTR and the
RTR introduce other behavioral effects. It can be argued that a taxpayer’s tax compliance decision
is not only dependent on his or her tax burden alone but also on the tax burden of other taxpayers.
As suggested by Fortin et al. (2007), taxpayers are not completely individualistic, thus some amount
of social interactions may also influence tax compliance behavior. This is also in line with the study
of Spicer and Becker (1980) who found strong correlation between tax compliance and perceptions.
So it is expected that if taxpayers perceive a particular tax regime to be fair, then they would
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comply more under that tax regime. However, tax compliance is expected to be higher under the
PTR than the RTR if fairness (equality) plays a huge role in driving behavior.
Table 3.4 also provides a summary of other predictions if taxpayers weigh in their taste for
equality (fairness) or risk preferences. The presence of high inequality aversion may drive higher
non-compliance in the RTR than the PTR. However, presence of low inequality aversion will produce
a counter result. Individuals in reality exhibit a significant amount of risk aversion [Binswanger
(1980), Kachelmeier and Mohamed (1992), and Holt and Laury (2002)]. Therefore, taking the
presence of risk into account, we can make some predictions based on our intuition. If an economic
agent chooses to report an amount less than his or her true income, then he or she automatically
faces a lottery. The lottery basically consists of payoff 1 if the agent is caught under-reporting, and
payoff 2 if the agent is not caught. The variance between payoff 1 and payoff 2 under the PTR is
larger than the alternate RTR. Differences in lottery under the PTR and the RTR directly change
the costs and benefits of non-compliance. For example, the costs and benefits of non-compliance is
higher under the PTR than the RTR.
Even without solving the model that imposes the assumption of risk-aversion, we can predict
the following based on the differences in the marginal tax rates under the PTR and the RTR: (i)
assuming the economic agent is risk-averse, then non-compliance in taxes will be greater under the
RTR than the PTR. Note that the above predictions are specified with weak inequality due the
experimental parameter values; (ii) if the agent is risk-seeking, then the direction of non-compliance
may be ambiguous due to two offsetting effects. For example, a higher marginal tax rate under the
PTR will increase tax compliance according the theoretical model. However, with a higher marginal
tax rate the benefit from non-compliance if taxpayer is not caught is higher under the PTR than
the RTR. As a result risk-seeking subjects under the PTR may comply less than those under the
RTR. Hence the two compounding effects may produce an ambiguous tax compliance result.
3.4 Description of Data
The definition of the variables used for the analyses is provided in Table 12 in Appendix 3.6. Table 13
in the Appendix provides a statistical summary of the data collected from the experiment. The
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average compliance rate across both the PTR and the RTR is about 25%. The means, standard
deviations, minimum and maximum values are reported in columns 2 to 5.
One hundred and nineteen subjects participated in the experiment consisting of 20 paying
rounds. Hence, the data-set constituted 2380 pooled observations. Out of 119 participants in
the experiment, 81 of them were males and 38 were females. Their age ranged from 18 to 39 years.
Approximately 38% of the observations were from the PTR treatment, 39% of the observations were
from the RTR treatment, and 24% of the observations were from the BASE treatment. Overall,
48% of the subjects received an income of 50 lab dollars and 52% of the subjects received 100 lab
dollars.
Throughout, a comparison between the behavioral response of subjects in terms of compliance
rate instead of evasion rate will be made. Similar to Alm et al. (1992) and Alm et al. (1999), a
compliance rate measure was constructed by dividing the reported income by the true income.
3.5 Results
Based on the parameter values that the subjects were provided, the optimal strategy for each subject
is to report zero income amount regardless of the tax regime. Hence, the strategy space rules out any
positive tax compliance rate. Each treatment was repeated a sufficient number of periods to insure
convergence. At least 50% of the observations in the PTR and the RTR reported zero compliance
rate. This result is important because it shows that subjects behaved according to the expected
utility theory. A summary of the proportion zero and full tax compliance is reported in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 indicates that the decision to report income is influenced by different factors that may
not necessarily be explained by expected utility theory. Schoemaker (1982) and Machina (1987)
echo similar sentiment. Table 3.5 shows evidence of this claim in terms of the three staircases of
tax compliance; full, some and zero compliance rate. First, it appears that a sizable portion of
the subjects chose the optimal strategy, that is to report zero income. Second, a relatively large
proportion of the subjects also chose to report some of their income. Third, a small fraction of
subjects in all of the sessions did not even search for ways to cheat. Pyle (1991) points out that
whilst the odds are heavily in favor of evaders getting away with cheating of taxes, some taxpayers
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Table 3.5: Proportion of Compliance Groups
Tax System Proportion of Zeros Proportion of Ones
Progressive LRR 0.52 0.06
HRR 0.54 0.08
Regressive LRR 0.54 0.09
HRR 0.52 0.12
BASE LRR 0.39 0.07
HRR 0.43 0.12
are relatively more inclined to report honestly.
A comparison of tax compliance behavior between the PTR and the RTR is considered. The
highest proportion of subjects that were honest were subjects that participated in RTR. Between
9% to 12% of the observations in the RTR were found at the right tail of the compliance rate
distribution compared to 6% to 8% in the PTR. Both the PTR and the RTR had an average of
about 53% of their observations massed at zero. The relatively large proportion of subjects that
chose compliance rates between 0% and 100% justifies the exploration of potential differences in tax
compliance behavior between the PTR and RTR.9 Average compliance rates along with standard
errors in the various treatments are reported in Table 3.6. On average, tax compliance rate for the
baseline treatment was approximately 38% in the LRR and 34% in the HRR. Even with the small
sample of data points for this treatment, the direction of tax compliance is consistent with Alm
et al. (1992). The experimental result of Alm et al. (1992) claim that an increase in taxes leads to a
decrease in tax compliance. However, tax compliance rate appears to increase with increments in the
progressivity or regressivity of the tax. For example, the average compliance rate was approximately
24% in the LRR and 26% in the HRR under the RTR. In contrast to the PTR, participants on
average had a tax compliance rate of approximately 23% in the LRR and 25% in the HRR. It is
surprising that the average compliance rate is nearly identical across both the PTR and the RTR.
Figure 3.2 also provides support for this claim. Figure 3.2 is simply a plot of average compliance
rate over 20 paying rounds. Figures 29 and 30 also provide a summary of average compliance rates
9There were notable differences in tax compliance behavior between subjects that had participated in the experi-
ment before. Overall, subjects that had participated in the experiment before complied less than new participants.
See Figure 31 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.6: Average Compliance Rates
Tax System LI Comp. Rate HI Comp. Rate Overall Comp. Rate
[Std] [Std] [Std]
Progressive LRR 0.223 0.249 0.236
[0.022] [0.024] [0.016]
HRR 0.262 0.262 0.262
[0.025] [0.024] [0.017]
Regressive LRR 0.263 0.235 0.234
[0.026] [0.337] [0.016]
HRR 0.337 0.215 0.272
[0.031] [0.026] [0.020]
BASE LRR 0.394 0.369 0.381
[0.035] [0.029] [0.023]
HRR 0.399 0.302 0.347
[0.036] [0.030] [0.023]
Notes: Average compliance rates are reported along with standard deviations. Standard errors are in [ ].
in the three tax systems. Figure 29 includes all the data points in each tax system while Figure 30
excludes observations at the extremities (or tails).
To fully assess tax compliance behavior across the tax regimes, a tax compliance measure is regressed
on tax regime dummies and other controls. The parametric estimation results are summarized in
Table 3.7. The property of the dependent variable provided an estimation challenge. Figure 27 in
Appendix 3.6 provides the distribution of the compliance rate. A quick inspection of this figure
indicates that some subjects are naturally honest and therefore comply fully even though it is not
optimal. A bulk of the participants were completely dishonest. The large concentration of this
extreme observed behavior in the dataset accounts for the mass at the two tails of the distribution.
To appropriately account for these masses in the data, the two-tailed Tobit estimation method was
employed. The two-tailed Tobit method provides consistent estimators.
The two-tailed Tobit model is reported alongside the random-effects model. The random-effects
model is reported to provide some comparison. The reduced-form equation that explains the average
compliance rate takes the form:
CR = a0 + a1PROGRESSIV E + a2MTR+ a3HIGHINCOME + ε (3.13)
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Figure 3.2: Average tax compliance rate across 20 paying rounds
where CR stands for compliance rate, and defined as the amount of reported income by the subject
divided by the true income; PROGRESSIVE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the tax system
is progressive, MTR variable is the marginal tax rate on each dollar of lab dollar reported by the
subject, and HIGH INCOME is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the salary of the subject is
100. Recall that the dependent variable CR is censored at 0 and 1, thus the regression equation is
estimated using a two-tailed Tobit method. A thorough discussion of the estimation procedure is
discussed in Appendix 3.6.10
The regression results reported in Table 3.7 are consistent across all model specifications. The
econometric results focus mainly on the tax regime treatment. The important result from the econo-
metric analysis is that, average compliance rate between the PTR and the RTR is statistically not
different from zero, holding everything else constant.11 While this result must be interpreted with
caution, it was interesting to observe that subject-taxpayers were not influenced by the tax regime
10See Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
11An evaluation of the subject decisions is done through several robustness check methods to ensure convincing
findings. These results are discussed in the subsequent section.
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Table 3.7: Estimation Results of Tax Compliance Equation
Variable RE 2T-Tobit RE 2T-Tobit
Constant 0.192*** -0.263*** 0.189*** -0.269***
[0.038] [0.110] [0.042] [0.134]
MTR 0.237*** 0.487** 0.198** 0.488**
[0.101] [0.233] [0.092] [0.234]
PROGRESSIVE 0.009 0.005
[0.058] [0.183]
HIGH INCOME 0.006 0.002
[0.012] [0.033]
Number of Obs. 1504 1504 1504 1504
R2 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
imposed on them. The result remained robust across different model specifications.12 Although this
result may be uninteresting, it still conveys an important contribution about how redistribution of
tax burden affects tax compliance. It also conveys the result of how social interaction effects (which
is a derivative of the two tax schemes) affects tax compliance decision. The explanation of social
interaction effects is that the fiscal parameters that both income groups faced in the two schemes
was public knowledge. The most likely explanation for the result no social interaction effects is
that, tax compliance behavior is an individualistic process. The public knowledge of the relative
tax burden of each income group did not influence the income reporting decision of subjects. A
broader interpretation of this result that is gaining traction is the effect of cultural norms on tax
compliance behavior. Nerre (2008) points out that tax culture is far more important than the ‘tax’
component.13 For the most part, differences in tax compliance were not present between the high
income group and the low income group. Only one RTR session produced significant difference in
tax compliance behavior. A rather odd result of higher non-compliance was found to be present
in the high income group than the low income group. Apart from this result, there were no other
significant differences in tax compliance behavior in either the PTR or the RTR. One should note
12There is evidence that a large proportion of subjects chose zero compliance rate in both the PTR and the RTR.
Approximately 51% of the observations in the PTR and the RTR are massed at zero compliance rate.
13As an anecdote, the tax compliance rate is higher in the US than other developed and developing countries like
Russia and Ghana.
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that the observations from the experiment are relatively homogenous. Subjects that participated
in the experiment were mainly from the southern region of the US.14
The MTR variable was statistically significant and positively related to compliance rate; a result
also obtained by Fortin et al. (2007) and Alm et al. (1995). This finding is not surprising since most
experimental results regarding the tax compliance response to changes in tax rates have not been
clear-cut. Other studies like Friedland et al. (1978) and Alm et al. (1992) have found tax compliance
to be decreasing with increase in tax rates. The level of income had no significant impact on tax
compliance.15
For exploratory purposes, we report the responses of other variables to tax compliance. The
results of the estimated equations are reported in Table 3.8. The control variables considered
were AGE, GENDER, FEEDBACK, FAIRNESS, INEQUALITY AVERSION, and RISK AVER-
SION. The variables like age, gender, fairness and inequality aversion were ascertained by the
post-experimental survey.
A MALE dummy variable was constructed and this variable equals 1 when the subject-taxpayer
is a male. The coefficient of the MALE variable was negative and statistically significant at the 1%
significance level. The coefficient suggests that average tax compliance was reduced by 26% when
the subject-taxpayer was a male. Alm et al. (1989) also found similar results. Torgler (2003) does
not find strong difference between males and females, but confirms that the tax compliance is a bit
higher for females. Also, the average compliance rate was statistically and positively related to the
AGE variable in the random-effects model (a result also obtained by Friedland et al. (1978)) and
not the two-limit Tobit model. The implication from this result is that older individuals are more
compliant than younger individuals. This is symmetrical to the view that young individuals like to
take more risk than older individuals.
The feedback variables also produced interesting results. The lag variables were LAG PENALTY,
14Preferably, a pooled data-set that includes individuals from different regions in the US would provide enough
heterogeneity and robustness test of the main research hypothesis in this paper.
15Similar to the relationship between tax compliance and taxes, the impact of income on tax compliance is also
not clear-cut. The direction of income with respect to tax compliance is similar to the studies by Torgler (2003) and
Friedland et al. (1978). They also found a negative relationship between tax compliance and income. Other studies
like Spicer and Becker (1980) and Jackson and Jones (1985) found a positive relationship between tax compliance
and income.
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LAG AUDIT and LAG WEALTH. The result of gambler’s fallacy was found across the two regres-
sion analysis. The lagged audit variable was found to be statistically and negatively related to tax
compliance. This result is related to the notion that subjects put little weight on audit occurring
in the subsequent rounds after they were audited in the previous round. As a result, subjects tend
to evade more of their taxes after an audit round. Also the lagged wealth variable was found to be
statistically and negatively related to the tax compliance rate.16
Following Fortin et al. (2007), an index that proxies for INEQUALITY AVERSION was con-
structed.17 Evidence from the two-limit Tobit estimates, suggest that subjects who were classified
as high inequality averse complied less.
A grade in terms of fairness of the tax regimes was obtained from the post-experimental survey.
Subjects were asked to choose a value between 0 (least fair) and 5 (very fair) to indicate the degree
of fairness of the the tax regime. According to regression results, fairness mattered in terms of tax
compliance. Subjects complied more regardless of the tax regime as long as they thought it was
a fair tax regime. Finally, a RISK AVERSE variable was constructed to classify subject-taxpayers
as risk-averse. The RISK AVERSE variable was positively and significantly related to the average
compliance rate. This result is consistent across all model specifications.
3.5.1 Robustness Check
The results discussed in this section pertain to a propensity model. The propensity model examines
the tax compliance behavior by decomposing the observed compliance behavior of subjects including
observations at the tail of the data distribution. The panel Logit model is estimated and reported
in Table 3.9. The coefficients are the regular Logit coefficients, not marginal effects. The signs of
the coefficients can be interpreted as directional responses. The results from the propensity model
serve mainly as a robustness check. The results in Table 3.9 are associated with three different
16To further explore subjects decisions across different tax regimes, the level of tax evasion is regressed on co-
variates found in Table 3.8. The results from this model are consistent with previous result. For example, increase
in the marginal tax rate was found to decrease the level of tax evasion. Risk aversion and fairness was also found to
be negatively correlated to the level of tax evasion. Also increase in the level of income was found to increase tax
evasion; a counter result of the theoretical model provided in the previous section.
17Subjects had to indicate their favorite share among to options: The alternative shares were (50 50) against (55,
65), (50 50) against (45, 70) and (50 50) against (35, 85). The index value is between 0 and 2. A high index value
represents high aversion while a low index value represents low aversion.
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equations. Column 2 of Table 3.9 reports the results associated with the equation that estimates
the propensity to cheat fully. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the subject cheats fully
and zero otherwise. The tax regime had no significant impact on the decision to cheat fully. The
MALE variable is the only variable that was found to induce subjects to cheat fully. The result is
significant at the 1% significance level.
Next, we consider the propensity model that estimates the factors that induce subjects to comply
fully. The reported results in column 3 is associated with this estimated equation. Interestingly, the
variable PTR had no impact. The MTR and RISK AVERSE variables were found to be statistically
significant. These results indicate that high marginal tax rate and risk-aversion tend to influence
the subject’s decision to comply fully.
The last column in Table 3.9 report the results of the equation that estimates the propensity to
partially cheat on taxes. All the variables were found to have no significant impact on the decision
to partially cheat with the exception of the MALE dummy variable. The result indicates that males
are more inclined to cheat than females.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper uses experimental data to simply examine whether taxpayers are sensitive to different
tax schemes. The experiment captures the essential features of tax systems in the real world, namely
the progressive and the regressive tax systems. Drawing on expected utility theory, this paper sheds
light on the sensitivity of risk-neutral taxpayers when faced with a portfolio-choice problem that
characterizes evasion as a risky asset and full disclosure as a riskless asset.
The testable hypothesis that falls out of the extended Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of
income reporting is that, tax compliance should be weakly greater in the progressive tax regime
than the regressive tax regime. If this hypothesis is correct, then redistribution of income may lead
to higher tax compliance in the progressive tax regime and lower tax compliance in the regressive
tax regime.
The framing of the tax compliance decision introduces some social interaction effects. There
were two income groups. Each income group knew the tax fiscal parameters they faced. The
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fiscal parameters faced by the other group were also public knowledge. This explanation of social
interaction effects is likely to drive tax compliance. This paper addresses whether these interaction
effects are strong enough to drive different tax compliance behavior under the two tax schemes.
The results from the experiments indicate that the progressive and the regressive tax systems
generate similar tax compliance behavior. This result was consistent across all model specifica-
tions. The result of equivalence in tax compliance between the progressive and the regressive tax
schemes continue to prevail even after controlling for income level, tax rate, gender, age, fairness,
inequality aversion, risk aversion, and feedback effects. There were at least three reasons that drove
tax compliance behavior in both tax schemes. The most significant findings suggest that high tax
revenue mechanisms lead to higher compliance rates. Fairness plays a significant role in determining
individual tax compliance behavior. Similarly, risk aversion contributed to an individual’s tax com-
pliance behavior. Personal characteristics of the individual such as gender influenced tax compliance
behavior.
From a broader perspective, the result of equivalence in tax compliance behavior between the
progressive and the regressive tax schemes suggests that social interaction effects is not a strong
factor that explains tax compliance. Rather, the results strengthen the position that tax compliance
is an individualistic process that is more likely to be influenced by the tax-culture within a society.
For the most part, subjects behaved according to the expected utility theory by choosing zero
compliance in both the progressive and regressive tax regimes. Both tax schemes suggest that
fiscal parameters and fairness-effects are more important in explaining individual tax compliance
behavior.
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Table 3.8: Estimation Results of Tax Compliance Equation
Variable RE 2T-Tobit RE 2T-Tobit
Constant 2.507*** 6.134*** 2.314*** 5.131***
[0.212] [0.798] [0.210] [0.727]
PROGRESSIVE -0.015 0.029
[0.028] [0.162]
REGRESSIVE -0.002 -0.052
[0.027] [0.155]
MTR 0.077*** 1.300*** 0.76*** 1.413***
[0.014] [0.237] [0.014] [0.238]
HIGH INCOME -0.003 -0.010 -0.00001 -0.009
[0.014] [0.031] [0.014] [0.031]
AGE 0.012*** 0.005 0.009* 0.004
[0.005] [0.021] [0.005] [0.021]
MALE -0.319*** -0.835*** -0.299*** -0.729***
[0.030] [0.175] [0.029] [0.166]
RISK AVERSE 0.099*** 0.381** 0.088*** 0.295*
[0.031] [0.192] [0.029] [0.184]
INEQ. AVERSE -0.052* -0.321*
[0.028] [0.183]
FAIR 0.06*** 0.376***
[0.013] [0.188]
LAG PENALTY -0.116*** -0.007*** -0.119*** -0.007***
[0.033] [0.002] [0.033] [0.002]
LAG WEALTH -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0005***
[0.00002] [0.00004] [0.00002] [0.00004]
EXPERIENCED -0.220*** -0.638† -0.241*** -0.669*
[0.068] [0.409] [0.067] [0.407]
Number of Obs. 1508 1508 1508 1508
R2 0.273 0.194 0.229 0.197
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
66
Table 3.9: Tax Compliance Propensity Model
Cheat Fully Comply Fully Cheat Some
PROG -0.277 0.544 0.239
[1.224] [0.767] [0.921]
HI 0.005 -0.114 -0.079
[0.228] [0.281] [0.195]
MTR -6.932*** 7.589*** 1.833
[1.733] [2.249] [0.482]
Risk Averse -2.191* 1.743* 0.294
[1.323] [0.960] [1.026]
Age -0.011 -0.010 -0.034
[0.134] [0.092] [0.118]
Male 7.497*** -1.228† -4.613***
[1.345] [0.783] [1.009]
Lag Penalty 0.058*** -0.068† -0.043***
[0.014] [0.043] [0.012]
Lag Wealth 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002
[0.004] [0.0004] [0.0003]
Constant -39.563*** 17.16**** 19.994***
[5.510] [5.004] [4.229]
Number of Obs. 1501 1501 1501
R2 0.246 0.151 0.146
Notes: Standard errors are in [ ]. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%;
67
Bibliography
68
Bibliography
Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of
Public Economics, 1:323–338.
Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1989). Institutional uncertainty and taxpayer compliance.
American Economic Review, 82(5):1018 – 26.
Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1992). Estimating the determinants of taxpayer compliance
with experimental data. National Tax Journal, 45:107–114.
Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., and Schulze, W. D. (1999). Changing the social norm of tax compliance
by voting. Kyklos, 52(141-171).
Alm, J., Sanchez, I., and de Juan, A. (1995). Economic and noneconomic factors in tax compliance.
Kyklos, 48:3–18.
Andergassen, R. (2008). High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock
option-based compensation. Economic Letters, 101(2):122 – 125.
Anderson, M., Banker, R., and Ravindran, S. (2000). Executive compensation in the information
technology industry. Management Science, 46:530–547.
Ballard, C. L. (1988). The marginal efficiency cost of redistribution. American Economic Review,
78:1019–1033.
Beck, P., Davis, J., and Jung, W. (1991). Experimental evidence of taxpayer reporting behavior.
Accounting Review, 66(4):535–558.
69
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy,
76:168–217.
Becker, W., Buchner, H.-J., and Sleeking, S. (1987). The impacts of public tranfer expenditures on
tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 34:243–252.
Bergstresser, D. and Philippon, T. (2006). Ceo incentives and earnings management. Journal of
Financial Economics, 80:511 – 529.
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitude toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural india. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62:395–407.
Bosworth, B. and Burtless, G. (1992). Effects of tax reform on labor supply, investment, and saving.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6:3–26.
Bruner, D., McKee, M., and Santore, R. (2008). Hand in the cookie jar: An experimental investi-
gation of equity-based compensation and managerial fraud. Southern Economic Journal.
Burns, N. and Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting.
Journal of Financial Economics, 79:35 – 67.
Burtless, G. (1987). The work response to a guaranteed income: A survey of experimental evidence.
In Munnel, A., editor, Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments. Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston.
Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cam-
bridge.
Chernick, H. (2005). On the determinants of subnational tax progressivity in the u.s. National Tax
Journal, LVIII(1):93–112.
Cotten, S. and Santore, R. (2008). Managerial teams, whistle-blowing and accounting fraud. Work-
ing Paper.
Croson, R. and Sundali, J. (2005). The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand: empirical data from
casinos. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30(3):195–209.
70
Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., and McKee, M. (2006). Experimental evidence on mixing
modes in income tax evasion. Public Finance Review, 34(6):663 – 686.
Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., and Torgler, B. (2004). Effects of culture on
tax compliance: A cross check of experimental and survey evidence. Working Paper, Center for
Research in Economics, Management and the Arts.
Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. (2006). Is there a link between executive compensation
and accounting fraud? Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1):113–143.
Feld, L. P. and Tyran, J.-R. (2002). Tax evasion and voting: An experimental analysis. Kyklos,
55(2):197–222.
Fishbacher, U. (1999). Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economics experiments. Working Paper
No.21 Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Zurich, Switzerland.
Fortin, B., Lacriox, G., and Villeval, M.-C. (2007). Tax evasion and social interactions. Journal of
Public Economics, 91:2089–2112.
Friedland, N., Maital, S., and Rutenberg, A. (1978). A simulation study of tax evasion. Journal of
Public Economics, 10:107–116.
Goerke, L. (2003). Tax evasion and tax progressivity. Public Finance Review, 31(2):189–203.
Goldman, E. and Slezak, S. L. (2006). An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence
of information manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics.
Guth, W. and Mackscheidt, K. (1985). An empirical study on tax evasion. Mimeo (University of
Cologne, Cologne).
Hall, B. and Liebman, J. (1998). Are ceos really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113:653–691.
Hall, B. and Murphy, K. (2003). The trouble with stock options. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
17:49 – 70.
71
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1):24–52.
Holt, C. and Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review,
92(5):1644–1655.
Ittner, C., Lambert, R., and Larcker, D. (2003). The structure and performance consequences of
equity grants in new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34:89–127.
Jackson, B. and Jones, S. (1985). Salience of tax evasion penalties versus detection risk. American
Economic Review, 6(2):7–17.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs,
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305–360.
Johnson, S. A., Ryan, H. E., and Tian, Y. S. (2008). Managerial incentives and corporate fraud:
The sources of incentive matter. Review of Finance.
Kachelmeier, S. J. and Mohamed, S. (1992). Examining risk preferences under high monetary in-
centives: Experimental evidence from the people’s republic of china. American Economic Review,
82(5):1120–41.
Kadan, O. and Yang, J. (2006). Executive stock options and earnings management: A theoretical
and empirical analysis. Working Paper.
Kay, J. (2004). Former enron ceo jeffrey skilling indicted.
Ke, B. (2003). The influence of equity-based compensation on. Working Paper, Penn State Univer-
sity.
Koskela, E. (1983). A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion. Journal of Public
Economics, 22:127–133.
Machina, M. J. (1987). Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 1:121–154.
72
MaCurdy, T., Green, D., and Paarsch, H. (1990). Assessing empirical approaches for analyzing
taxes and labor supply. Journal of Human Resources, 25:415–490.
Mitra, T., Ok, O. A., and Kockesen, L. (1998). Popular support for progressive taxation and the
relative income hypotheses. Economic Letters, 58(1):69–75.
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors, Handbook
of Labor Economics, volume 3. North Holland, Amsterdam.
Murphy, K. J. (2003). Stock based pay in new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
34:129–147.
Nerre, B. (2008). Tax culture: A basic concept for tax politics. Economic Analysis and Policy,
38(1):153–167.
Plott, C. R. (1987). In laboratory exeperimentation in economies: Six points of view. In Roth,
A. E., editor, Dimensions of parallelism: Some policy applications of experimental methods, pages
193–219. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pyle, D. J. (1991). The economics of taxpayer compliance. Journal of Economic Surveys, 5(2):163–
198.
Robison, D. H. and Santore, R. (2008). Managerial incentives, fraud, and monitoring. SSN -
Working Paper.
Ross, S. (1973). The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. American Economic
Review, 63(2):134–9.
Schoemaker, P. J. (1982). The expected utility model: Its variants, purposes, evidence, and limita-
tions. Journal of Economic Literature, 20:529–563.
Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, S. (2000). Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration. NBER Working
Paper No. 7473.
Spicer, M. and Becker, L. (1980). Fiscal inequity and tax evasion. National Tax Journal, 33(2):263
– 267.
73
Spicer, M. and Everett, T. J. (1982). Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: An experi-
mental approach. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2:241–5.
Torgler, B. (2003). Beyond punishment: A tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in costa rica.
Revista de Analisis Economico, 18(1):27–56.
Triest, R. K. (1990). The effect of income taxation on labor supply in the united states. Journal of
Human Resources, 25:491–516.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press,
Cambridge Masschusetts.
Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A note on income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public
Economics, 3:201 – 202.
74
Appendices
75
Appendix A: Proofs
76
Proof of Proposition 1
Let the manager choose (E1, F1) when he or she is compensated with contract (α1,K1, ω1). There
are three cases to consider: Case (i). If (E1, F1) is such that Pr(S˜M > K) = 0, then it is straight
forward to show that E1 = 0 and F1 = 0. We ignore the uninteresting case when the stock option
is “under-water” since the manager will choose zero effort and zero fraud. Case (ii). If (E1, F1) is
such that Pr(S˜M > K) = 1, then (E1, F1) solves equations 2.2 and 2.3. Case(iii). If (E1, F1) is such
that 0 < Pr(S˜M > K) < 1, then (E1, F1) must be the simultaneous solution to equations 2.5 and
2.6. It is straightforward to verify that 2.2 and 2.3 together imply (A1) below, and that 2.5 and 2.6
together also imply (A1):
φ′(E)
pf ′(E)
= x′(F ) (A1)
Therefore, for case (ii) and case (iii), the manager’s optimal choice (E1, F1) must satisfy
φ′(E1)
pf ′(E1)
= x′(F1) (A2)
Similar reasoning implies that if the manager chooses (E2, F2) when he or she is compensated with
contract (α2,K2, ω2), then (E2, F2) must satisfy
φ′(E2)
pf ′(E2)
= x′(F2) (A3)
Now suppose that E1 = E2, then (A2) and (A3) imply
x′(F1) = x′(F2) (A4)
Since x(F ) is increasing and strictly convex, it follows that x′(F ) is monotonic. Finally, using the
fact that x′(F ) is monotonic, (A4) implies F1 = F2.
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Proof of Convergence
Consider two contracts; O and E. Contract is O is the option contract and contract E is the simple
equity contract. Let s
¯
and s¯ denote the lower and upper bound respectively. Let s¯ = s
¯
+ 2b. Now
consider the contract E that is in the money with certainty. Under contract E, the manager’s
objective is
α
2b
∫ s
¯
+2b
s
¯
(S −K)dS − φ(e)− px(f) (14)
By further manipulation, the above objective reduces to
αb+ α(s
¯
−K)− φ(e)− px(f) (15)
In order to test for convergence, let’s suppose that K → s
¯
, then
lim
K→s
¯
[αb+ α(s
¯
−K)− φ(e)− px(f)] (16)
αb+ α · lim
K→s
¯
[s
¯
−K]− φ(e)− px(f) (17)
αb+ αK · lim
K→s
¯
[
s
K¯
− 1]− φ(e)− px(f) (18)
αb+ αK · { lim
K→s
¯
[
s
K¯
]− lim
K→s
¯
[1]} − φ(e)− px(f) (19)
αb+ αK · {(1)− (1)} − φ(e)− px(f) (20)
αb− φ(e)− px(f) (21)
Now consider the contract O. Recall that the manager’s objective when the option is in the
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money with some probability is
αbpi2 − φ(e)− px(f) (22)
which can be re-written as
αb{ [s¯−K]
2b
[s¯−K]
2b
} − φ(e)− px(f) (23)
αb{ [s¯+ 2b−K]2b
[s
¯
+ 2b−K]
2b
} − φ(e)− px(f) (24)
Again as s
¯
→ K, then
αb lim
K→s
¯
{( [s¯−K]2b + 1)(
[s
¯
−K]
2b
+ 1)} − φ(e)− px(f) (25)
αb lim
K→s
¯
{( [s¯−K]2b + 1)} · { limK→s
¯
(
[s
¯
−K]
2b
+ 1)} − φ(e)− px(f) (26)
αb{K
2b
[1− 1] + 1)}(K
2b
[1− 1] + 1)} − φ(e)− px(f) (27)
αb− φ(e)− px(f) (28)
This implies that the two objectives converge as K → s
¯
.
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Two-Tailed Tobit Model
Consider the following linear model with random effects
yit = Xitβ + δi + it
where i = 1, ..., N represents each subject over t = 1, ..., T periods. The dependent variable yit
represents compliance rate and Xit represents a set of covariates. The random effects, δi are i.i.d.,
N(0, σ2δ ) and it are i.i.d N(0, σ
2
 ) independently of δi. The percent contribution to the total variance
of the panel-level variance is capture by
ρ =
σ2δ
σ2 + σ2δ
The tobit panel estimator is no different from the tobit pooled estimator if ρ = 0.
Let yOit denoted the observed data which also includes the censored version of yit. y
O
it is censored
at both tails of the distributions. At the left-censored, yit ≤ yOit = 0 while at the right-censored
yit ≥ yOit = 1. If yit is uncensored, yit = yOit .
The joint (unconditional of δi) density of the observed data from the ith panel
f(yOi1, ..., y
O
ini |Xi1, ..., Xini) =
∞∫
−∞
e−δ2i /2σ2δ√
2piσδ
{
ni∏
t=1
F
(
yOit , Xitβ + δi
)}
dδi
where
F
(
yOit ,4it
)
=

(
√
2piσ)−1e−(y
O
it−4it)2/2σ2 if yOit ∈ NC
Φ
(
yOit−4it
σ
)
if yOit ∈ L
1− Φ
(
yOit−4it
σ
)
if yOit ∈ R
where NC represent the noncensored observations, L is the set of left-censored observation, R is
the set of right-censored observations, and Φ() is the cumulative normal distribution.
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The panel level likelihood li is given by
li =
∞∫
−∞
e−δ2i /2σ2δ√
2piσδ
{
ni∏
t=1
F
(
yOit , Xitβ + δi
)}
dδi ≡
∞∫
−∞
g
(
yOit , Xit,
√
2σˆa∗m + µˆi
)
dδi
The default approximation of the log likelihood is by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which
approximates the panel level likelihood with
li ≈
√
2σˆ
M∑
m=1
w∗m exp
{
(a∗m)
2
}
g
(
yOit , Xit,
√
2σˆa∗m + µˆi
)
The log likelihood is approximated by
L ≈
n∑
i=1
wi log{
√
2σˆ
M∑
m=1
w∗m exp
{
(a∗m)
2
} exp{− (√2σ̂ia∗m + µˆi)2 /2σ2δ}√
2piσδ
ni∏
t=1
F
(
yOit , Xitβ +
√
2σˆia∗m + µˆi
)
}
where wi = 1 is a weight parameter for subject i.
Panel Logit Model
Consider an underlying latent variable model:
C∗it = xitβ + vit
where i = 1, ..., N represents each individual over t = 1, ..., T periods. The dependent variable C∗it is
a latent variable, vit is a continuously distributed variable independent of xit. Since C∗it is a latent
variable, we only observe the following
Cit =

1 C∗it > 0
0 otherwise
82
The Logit model is specified as follows: Assuming a normal distribution, N(0, σ2v), for the random
effects vi,
Pr(Ci1, ..., Cini |xi1, ..., xini) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−v2i /2σ2v√
2piσv
{
ni∏
t=1
F (Cit, xitβ + vi
}
dvi
where
F (C, z) =

1
1+exp(−z) if C 6= 0
1
1+exp(z) otherwise
The log likelihood, L is calculated using
L ≈
n∑
i=1
wi log
[
1√
pi
M∑
m=1
w∗m
ni∏
t=1
F
{
Cit, xitβ + a∗m
(
2ρ
1− ρ
)1/2}]
where w∗m denote the quadrature weights, a∗m denote the quadrature abscissas, and ρ = σ2v/(σ2v + 1)
denote the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component.
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Table 10: Data Description
Variable Name Variable Definition
Effort Amount of contribution to the project
Fraud False contribution to the project
ETi = 1 if treatment provides a simple equity contract
STi = 1 if treatment provides a stock option contract
Lag Penalty Penalty amount the subject received in the previous
round
Lag Audit = 1 if the subject was audited in the previous round
Lag Wealth Cumulative amount of earnings from previous rounds
Risk Averse = 1 if the subject shows risk aversion in the gamble
exercise
Ability Measures the number of questions answered correctly
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Table 11: Description & Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Effort 82.09 29.84 10 120
Fraud 142.57 132.78 0 400
ET 0.51 0.50 0 1
ST 0.49 0.50 0 1
Risk Averse 0.60 0.49 0 1
Lag Penalty 45.50 154.91 0 920
Lag Audit 0.21 0.41 0 1
Lag Wealth 272.36 186.26 -540.5 655.15
Ability 3.17 1.94 0 5
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Table 12: Data Description
Variable Name Variable Definition
Compliance rate Ratio of reported income to true income
PTR = 1 if tax regime is progressive
RTR = 1 if tax regime is regressive
BASE = 1 if tax regime is proportional
MTR Marginal tax rate
High Income = 1 if income equals 100 lab dollars
Lag Penalty Penalty amount the subject received in the previous
round
Lag Audit = 1 if the subject was audited in the previous round
Lag Wealth Cumulative amount of earnings from previous rounds
Risk Averse = 1 if the subject shows risk aversion in the gamble
exercise
Age Age of the subject
Male = 1 of the subject is a male
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Appendix D: Figures
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Figure 3: Note: Assuming the v(e) =
√
e, φ(e) = e, p = {0.1, 0.2.0.5}, and x(f) = f2, we obtain
the following effort-fraud schedules.
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Figure 4: Note: As effort increases, the probability of good draws of true stock value increases.
The restriction that f(0)− b > 0 ensures a realization of a positive value of the firm’s stock in the
event that the manager invests in no effort. This restriction also rules out the possibility that the
manager can cash in from the stock compensation package by investing an effort level of zero
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Figure 5: Note: As effort and fraud increases, the distribution shifts to the right, thus the propen-
sity of the option to be above water increases. As expected fraud and strike price increases, the
distribution shifts to the left, thus propensity of the option to be above water decreases
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Figure 6: Strategy Space of the Experiment
93
Figure 7: Distribution of Effort
94
Figure 8: Distribution of Fraud
95
Figure 9: Screen Shot of Gamble-Guaranteed Game
96
Figure 10: Screen Shot of Gamble Game
97
Figure 11: Introduction Screen Shot
98
Figure 12: Preview of the Game Screen Shot
99
Figure 13: Project Description Screen Shot
100
Figure 14: Artificial Component Description Screen Shot
101
Figure 15: Random Amount Description Screen Shot
102
Figure 16: Earnings Description Screen Shot
103
Figure 17: Second-Part Earnings Description Screen Shot
104
Figure 18: Penalty Description Screen Shot
105
Figure 19: Total Earnings Description Screen Shot
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Figure 20: Summary A Description Screen Shot
107
Figure 21: Summary B Description Screen Shot
108
Figure 22: Calculation Example Screen Shot
109
Figure 23: Calculation Example Results Screen Shot
110
Figure 24: Decision Screen Shot
111
Figure 25: Audit Summary Screen Shot
112
Figure 26: Earnings Summary Screen Shot
113
Figure 27: Full Sample - Distribution of Tax Compliance Rate
114
Figure 28: Noncensored Sample Distribution of Tax compliance Rate
115
Figure 29: Full Sample - Average Tax Compliance Rate
116
Figure 30: Sub-Sample - Average Tax Compliance Rate
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Figure 31: Average Compliance Rate Across Experienced and Inexperienced Participants
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Figure 32: Introduction Screen Shot
119
Figure 33: Preview of the PTR Experiment Instruction Screen Shot
120
Figure 34: Preview of the RTR Experiment Instruction Screen Shot
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Figure 35: Preview of the BASE Experiment Instruction Screen Shot
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Figure 36: Determining Income Screen Shot
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Figure 37: Tax Information Screen Shot
124
Figure 38: Tax Information Screen Shot
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Figure 39: Tax Information Screen Shot
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Figure 40: Income Report Screen Shot
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Figure 41: Penalty Structure Screen Shot
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Figure 42: Earnings Report Screen Shot
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Figure 43: Summary 1 Screen Shot
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Figure 44: Summary 2 Screen Shot
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Figure 45: Income Reporting Screen Shot
132
Figure 46: IRB Approval Letter
133
Figure 47: Consent Information Sheet
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